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Documents

January 15, 1958

Correspondence Extract No. 549 from Washington to Comrade Rapacki

The Polish ambassador discusses American opinions on the Rapacki Plan, including both the interest and negative responses it has received.

April 9, 1968

Excerpts from Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev’s speech at the April 1968 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party

Brezhnev discusses negotiations with the United States over the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

February 21, 1990

Assessment by the Austrian Foreign Ministry, 'Question of German Unity (State of affairs, February 1990)'

The assessment by the Austrian Foreign Ministry of German Unity is broken into five subject areas. The first part concerns the responsibility of the Four Powers to a new unified Germany. Next, West Germany's commitment to German unity dating as far back as 1970. The third portion outlines the border and security concerns of East and West Germany, as well as the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, and France. The next part is focused on economic recovery, specifically the lack of certain goods in East Germany (ie cars and houses). Finally, the report addresses the future developments of a unified Germany with an emphasis on the security of nearby states.

December 29, 1965

Memorandum by General Staff of Defense (SMD) to the Minister, 'Special Committee. Working group for the planning'

The note outlines the Italian policy with regards to the activities of the Working group on planning, of which Italy is a part together with the US, the UK, Germany and Turkey.

December 10, 1957

Letter, Nikolai Bulganin to Dwight D. Eisenhower

Bulganin proposes a halt on nuclear tests among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom beginning on January 1, 1958.

July 4, 1974

Letter by the Italian Ambassador in London, Raimondo Manzini, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Aldo Moro

Italian Ambassador to London, Raimondo Manzini, writes to Foreign minister Moro in the aftermath of the 1974 Ottawa Declaration. He discusses the British interest in reviving the Special Relationship with the US and its effects on European politics, and suggests that through intensified dialogue and cooperation, an Anglo-Italian solidarity could function as a counterweight to the close Franco-German relations.

February 2, 1971

Memorandum from [withheld] for Deputy Chief [withheld], 'Recent Radio Free Europe (RFE) Broadcasts to Poland' [Declassified September 19, 2016]

CIA officials responsible for RFE question the criticism of RFE Polish broadcasts by the Polish Government, the West German Government, and the State Department and conclude that coverage of the December 1970 unrest in Poland was responsible and effective.

March 1, 1967

Research Memorandum REU-13 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Reasons for West German Opposition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty'

By the late winter/early spring of 1967, controversy over the NPT was hurting US-West German relations, placing them at perhaps their lowest point during the Cold War. While this report suggested that West Germany would ultimately sign the Treaty, despite objections, only weeks later the INR issued another report wondering whether Bonn was trying to wreck the NPT.

March 3, 1967

Research Memorandum REU-14 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'How Major NATO Countries View the Prospect of an ABM Deployment'

Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

October 13, 1965

Research Memorandum RSB-115 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Soviet Views of Nuclear Sharing and Nonproliferation'

INR looked closely at Soviet positions on an NPT arguing that the Soviets appeared to “attach a higher priority in using the nondissemination issue as a means of attacking possible NATO nuclear arrangements than in concluding an agreement.”

Pagination