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Documents

October 22, 1979

Memorandum of conversation between Dutch Defense Minister Willem Scholten and US Deputy National Security Advisor David Aaron

A conversation between Dutch Defense Minister Scholten and US Deputy National Security Advisor Aaron in which Aaron outlines and defends the United States' views of the Netherlands' position on TNF modernization.

June 4, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Eleventh Restricted Session

Zhou reports on the eleventh restricted session on Indochina. During the session, Zhou opposes using the UN as a supervisory body, and asserts that the joint commission should take major responsibility in implementing the armistice, and that the NNSC's function is to supervise the joint commission's work and the Indochina borders.

June 5, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twelfth Restricted Session

Zhou reports on the twelfth restricted session on Indochina. Participants consider Zhou's proposal that the NNSC should be responsible to the Geneva Conference participants. Molotov gives his counterarguments to Smith's and Bidault's statements.

July 11, 1968

Minutes of Conversation between Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Brijuni, Croatia

Minutes of conversation between Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser with occasional input from advisors. Nasser describes the situation in the Middle East, including Egypt's relations with the United States and fighting along the Suez Canal. The two leaders also discuss UN Special Envoy Gunnar Jarring's recent activities. Tito closes with a recount of his visit to Japan, Mongolia, Iran, and Moscow and an update of the Yugoslav economy.

May 8, 1961

Department of State Cable 5245 to Embassy United Kingdom, Message from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan

President Kennedy writes British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to discuss the implications for NATO and West German security if the US or UK assisted the French nuclear program.

1985

Nuclear Power, Nuclear Weapons: The Deadly Connection

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament pamphlet arguing that nuclear power and weapons are inseparable and this inseparability leads to the constant violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which must be severely strengthened to avoid nuclear war.

June 17, 1959

Information on Foreign Counterintelligence Agents Network Abroad

The report covers the work of Bulgarian intelligence operatives in the West for the last 18 months. Includes statistics by country.

June 2007

Coordination of Soviet and Czechoslovak Intelligence Operations. Folder 80. The Chekist Anthology.

This folder consists of a detailed operational plan for cooperation between the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB for the years 1975-1978. Specific objectives include penetrating the military, political, and economic establishments of the United States, Britain, West Germany, France, and NATO, impeding the activities of the Czech Congress of National Development (KNR), collecting information on “Zionist intrigues,” gathering scientific/technical information on Western achievements in the fields of biological, chemical, and thermonuclear weapons, and using active measures to curtail the activities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in West Germany.

July 31, 1953

Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee (Draft)

Draft resolution before the CPSU CC, seeking approval for actions required to strengthen the Soviet position in Germany and increasing the counteraction of the aggressive plans of the Anglo-American bloc in Europe.

February 3, 1973

Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry A. Kissinger, 'Missile Assistance to France -- New NSSM'

Laird has made four practical recommendations on how to proceed with French/US nuclear relations. Laird's four points involve information on nuclear effects simulator types, the sale of small simulators, general hardening technology, and/or ABM intelligence. The US has given as much technical assistance as possible thus far within the current guidelines, and it is up to the president to address the issues related to changes in policy to continue the assistance. He is urged to consider especially the impact such aid would have on relations with the UK and the Soviet Union, but we should not cut off all assistance while these issues are being addressed.

Pagination