Search | Wilson Center Digital Archive

Switch to Visualization

United States Nuclear Proliferation Clear All

Related Resources

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Nuclear Proliferation

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

Western Europe

France

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

South Asia

Pakistan

"The Bundeshaus (Federal Building) in Bonn, West Germany, May 1961. "

Western Europe

West Germany

Pakistani Nuclear History

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

Western Europe

Great Britain

A photo of Henry Kissinger from 1975

Kissinger, Henry

1923-

Indian Nuclear History

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

United States. Department of State

-

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

United States. Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research

-

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Hughes, Thomas Lowe

1925-

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Iklé, Fred Charles

-

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Lord, Winston

-

Brazilian Nuclear History

Warsaw Pact

Results:

11 - 20 of 121

Display:

Sort By:

Documents

September 4, 1962	Research Memorandum RSB-152 from Roger Hilsman to the Secretary, 'Soviet Tactics in Talks on the Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons' Before the words “nuclear nonproliferation” entered official discourse, the term “non-diffusion” (or “non-dissemination”) of nuclear weapons was used routinely. In part stemming from the negotiations over Berlin, during 1962-1963 the Kennedy administration held talks with allies and adversaries on the possibility of a non-diffusion agreement which included Germany. In light of a recent Soviet proposal, INR veteran Soviet expert Sonnenfeldt explained why Moscow had moved away from earlier proposals singling out West Germany and was focusing on the general applicability of a non-diffusion agreement.
February 21, 1962	Research Memorandum RSB-58 from Roger Hilsman to the Secretary, 'Probable Soviet Reaction to Establishment of Multilateral NATO-Controlled MRBM Force' As discussion of a NATO multilateral force (MLF) unfolded, unfolded, one question which had to be addressed was how the Soviet Union would respond to the creation of such a NATO force. Because a NATO force would increase Western military capabilities, Soviet opposition was assumed.
January 31, 1962	Research Memorandum REU-25 from Roger Hilsman to Mr. Kohler, 'European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability' Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”
June 4, 1957	Department of State Office of Intelligence Research, 'OIR Contribution to NIE 100-6-57: Nuclear Weapons Production by Fourth Countries – Likelihood and Consequences' This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57. Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the “Fourth Country” problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957, Secret
July 27, 1982	National Intelligence Estimate NIE 4-82, 'Nuclear Proliferation Trends Through 1987' This estimate seeks to analyze the actions of a series of countries, which in the course of 1982-1987 could affect U.S. interests. It analyzes countries with developing nuclear programs in different regions in the world (South Asia, East Asia, Near East, Latin America, and Africa) and their intentions and capabilities in terms of nuclear weapons.
February 7, 1967	Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Euratom Commission Draft proposed by the US Government to the USSR. Contains six articles detailing the obligations and responsibilities of nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states.
October 28, 1958	Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'Gromyko Discussed the Issue of Stopping Nuclear Weapons Tests' Gromyko informs Liu Xiao of the Soviet position and strategy in its negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom for halting nuclear tests.
September 23, 1977	State Department telegram 229507 to U.S. Embassy London et al., 'Nuclear Suppliers Meeting – Assessment' This document describes the progress made up to that point and the various concerns of countries within the group regarding the scale of safeguards, particularly from the French and Germans. The NSG also agreed to make the guidelines available to the IAEA so that it could publish them. The State Department had been reluctant to publish them, not least because they did not include full scope safeguards, but overriding that was an interest in dispelling Third World concerns about a “secret cartel.”
September 15, 1977	State Department telegram 222114 to U.S. Embassy Paris, 'Nuclear Suppliers Meeting' This document reflects that while full-scope safeguards had wide support in the group, both the French and the West German remained opposed. The Carter administration tried to persuade the French but they were worried about being "isolated" in the group and talked about withdrawing or opposing further meetings because the NSG had “fully achieved” its objectives. Washington persuaded Paris not to withdraw, but the group’s future was plainly uncertain.
May 3, 1977	State Department telegram to U.S. Embassy London et al., 'Nuclear Suppliers Meeting, April 28-29, 1977' This document describes the meeting of 15 nuclear supplier states in London where issues were discussed such as full-scope safeguards, including sanctions in the guidelines, purpose of supplier consent, moratoriums, enlargement of membership, and various countries' individual concerns were voiced and addressed.