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Documents

December 8, 1972

A. Putintsev and V. Gorovoy, 'Key Aspects of Korean-Chinese relations in 1972'

A letter from the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang reviewing developments in Sino-North Korean relations in 1972, including the effects of China’s anti-Soviet campaigns and Beijing’s seeking of closer ties with the US and Japan.

November 9, 1944

Letter No. 402 from L.D. Wilgress, Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, W.L. Mackenzie King

The Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, L.D. Wilgress, thoroughly reviews Soviet foreign policy in Europe, Asia, and in Latin America and its relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. Wilgress optimistically concludes that "the Soviet Government are desirous of co-operating fully with the other great powers."

May 30, 1967

Intelligence Note 418 from George C. Denney, Jr., to the Secretary, 'Probable Effects of Chinese Possession of MRBMs on Vietnam War'

A prospective Chinese MRBM force led INR to consider whether Beijing would believe that it had more freedom of action to step up its involvement in the Vietnam War: it “might feel freer in extending aid to Hanoi and becoming more involved in the war if US pressure on the North Vietnamese seemed to require it.”

March 27, 1967

Intelligence Note 242 from George C. Denney, Jr., to the Secretary, 'Peking May Have ICBMs in 1971'

Years before Beijing actually deployed an ICBM in 1981, US intelligence estimated the possibility of the deployment of a “few operable, though probably relatively inefficient missiles” as early as 1971.

January 11, 1967

Intelligence Note 13 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'The Chinese Nuclear Threat to Non-Communist Asia'

Prepared by Edward Hurwitz, a Foreign Service officer and future ambassador then on assignment to INR, this report treated ICBMs as China’s main weapons goal, an eventual means for a “credible threat” to Beijing’s U.S. and Soviet “arch enemies.”

August 12, 1966

Intelligence Note 506 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Will Communist China Give Nuclear Aid to Pakistan?'

Intelligence reports about recent visits to Beijing by Pakistani defense and science officials raised questions whether China was or would be providing nuclear aid to Pakistan. The latter was already developing close relations with China, a matter which was of great concern to U.S. policymakers, but INR analyst Thomas Thornton concluded that Pakistan was highly unlikely to seek a significant degree of Chinese nuclear assistance.

July 30, 1965

Memorandum from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Recent Indonesian Statements Concerning Nuclear Weapons'

Statements by Indonesian authorities notwithstanding, INR analysts did not “believe that Indonesia possesses the facilities, personnel and radioactive material necessary for producing an atomic device with any speed.”

July 15, 1965

Research Memorandum REU-25 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Attitudes of Selected Countries on Accession to a Soviet Co-sponsored Draft Agreement on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'

With a nuclear nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Washington, INR considered which countries were likely to sign on and why or why not. INR analysts, mistakenly as it turned out, believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a co-sponsor of a treaty in part because of the “international climate” and also because Moscow and Washington differed on whether a treaty would recognize a “group capability.”

April 23, 1965

Intelligence Note from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Will Communist China Assist Other Nations in Acquiring Nuclear Weapons?'

Only months after China’s first nuclear test in October 1964, INR looked into whether Beijing would help other nations get the bomb.

October 1, 1962

Research Memorandum RFE-44 from Roger Hilsman to Acting Secretary, 'Japan’s Reaction to a Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation'

This “Limited Distribution” report on possible Japanese reactions did not anticipate that a test would cause basic changes in US-Japan security relations or in Tokyo’s general approach to nuclear weapons.

Pagination