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November 8, 1982

'Pakistan-US: Demarche on F-16 Equipment,' 11/8/82, with Memo from McMahon to Carlucci, 'Risk Assessment of the Sale of AN/ALR-69 Radar Warning Receiver to Pakistan,'1 1/8/82, and Excerpt from Natl Intel Est on Pakistan

With delivery of U.S. F-16 fighter-bombers imminent, Pakistan threatens to refuse delivery unless the U.S. agrees to include the ALR-69 radar warning receiver for the aircraft. CIA analysts have concerns that including this sensitive radar technology in the delivery of the F-16s would enable China, a close military ally of Pakistan, to obtain and study the device.

August 30, 1971

Meeting between Soviet academic and envoy to Israel, Yevgeni Primakov and Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir, 30 August 1971

Primakov came to hear a concrete offer from Golda on how to push the peace process forward. The Prime Minister was unwilling to go into specifics. Primakov informed Golda that as far as the Soviet Union was concerned there was a linkage between Israeli concessions and immigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. According to Primakov, as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict remained unsettled, the Soviet Union could not be seen as acting against the interests of its Arab allies by allowing unrestricted Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union to Israel.

June 15, 1973

Excerpts from a Record of a Meeting between Soviet journalist, Victor Louis, and General Director of the Prime Minister’s Office, Mordechai Gazit

Record of a meeting between Mordechai Gazit (MG), General Director of the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, and Victor Louis (VL), a Soviet journalist. The meeting was held the week before a summit meeting between Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev. The two discussed the immigration of Jews from the Soviet Union and the low state of Israeli-Soviet relations.

June 17, 1982

Terry Jones, Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy, Dept of State, to J. Devine et al., enclosing summaries of State Dept cable traffic during 1981-1982 relating to demarches on attempted purchase of sensitive nuclear-related products

A summary of U.S. State Department cable traffic regarding Pakistan’s nuclear efforts in 1981-1982. While the Reagan administration was inclined to give Pakistan some leeway in light of their support for anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the acquisition of sensitive nuclear technology from abroad was still something that the administration was against. Evidence that Pakistan had made efforts, some successful, to acquire specific technology that suggested a nuclear test was being prepared raised a red flag in the U.S. government

August 20, 1981

Acting Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence, National Foreign Assessment Center, to Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 'Warning Report-Nuclear Proliferation'

In response to an IAEA report that Pakistan diverted plutonium from the Karachi nuclear power plant, a CIA analysis suggests that the Pakistanis “were not overly concerned” about these events. Of greater concern to regional security and stability was the discussions of the sale of F-16 fighter-bombers as part of a U.S. aid package to ensure Pakistan’s cooperation in the covert efforts against Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

April 9, 1981

Special Assistant for NPI, NFAC, CIA, to Resource Management Staff, Office of Program Assessment et al, 'Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation'

Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.

January 31, 1980

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to Ambassador-at-Large Gerard C. Smith, enclosing excerpts from memoranda of conversations with Geng Biao and Deng Xiaoping.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had an immediate impact on U.S. policy toward Pakistan and U.S. aid to the anti-Soviet resistance through Islamabad. With these considerations, the U.S. chose to “set [the nuclear issue] aside for the time being.”

October 27, 1978

Conspect of Conversations with V. I. Potapov, Chief of Romanian Sector of CPSU CC Section

V.I Potapov informs about a visit to Bucharest of the CPSU delegation led by A. A. Gromyko and the discussions regarding the “Bessarabian question,” criticism of the CPSU regarding RSR’s relations with the USA and NATO and independent relations with China, RSR’s distancing from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in terms of foreign policy.

June 27, 1978

Exposition of the Conversations with Cde. V. I. Potapov, Chief of the Romanian Sector of the CPSU CC

Briefing given by V. I. Potapov on the dispute between the USSR and the SSR regarding the historical treatment of Soviet-Romanian relations. The SSR was accused of pursuing an independent foreign policy and offering a bad example for other socialist countries. Some issues examined were: the Romanian position in the Belgrade Negotiations, the RCP attitude towards “Eurocommunism," the Romanian position towards Africa, the Middle East and China and the Moldavian question.

December 4, 1973

Joint State/Defense Message, “Korean Northwest Coastal Situation"

The U.S. Departments of Defense and State offer instructions about how to respond to the Northern Limit Line Dispute, including measures to restrain South Korea.

Pagination