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August 11, 1985

Cable No. 662, Ambassador Kato to the Foreign Minister, 'Problem of the Release of the American Hostages (Meeting of Special Envoy Nakayama and Foreign Minister Shara)'

A telegram from Japanese Ambassador Kato to the Foreign Minister summarizing a meeting between Special Envoy Nakayama and Foreign Minister Shara about the relationship between Japan and Syria and the American hostages in Lebanon.

August 9, 1985

Cable No. 1381, Charge d’Affaires Tanabe to the Foreign Minister, 'Problem of the Release of the American Hostages (Meeting of Special Envoy Nakayama and Foreign Minister Velayati)'

A telegram from Japanese diplomat Ryuichi Tanabe summarizing a conversation between Special Envoy Nakayama and Foreign Minister Velayati about the American hostages in Lebanon.

August 8, 1985

Cable No. 1374, Charge d’Affaires Tanabe to the Foreign Minister, 'Problem of the Release of the American Hostages (Problem of Iranian Side’s Attempt to Issue Press Statement)'

A telegram from Japanese diplomat Ryuichi Tanabe describing the secrecy and potential leak of a meeting between Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani and Special Envoy Nakayama on the American hostages held in Lebanon

August 8, 1985

Cable No. 1373, Charge d’Affaires Tanabe to the Foreign Minister, 'Problem of the Release of the American Hostages (Meeting between Special Envoy Nakayama and Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani)'

A telegram from Japanese diplomat Ryuichi Tanabe to the Foreign Minister summarizing a meeting between Special Envoy Nakayama and Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani about the American hostages in Lebanon. Special Envoy Nakayama is delivering a letter from Prime Minister Nakasone.

August 6, 1985

Cable No. 1368, Charge d’Affaires Tanabe to the Foreign Minister, 'Problem of the Release of the American Hostages (Meeting of Special Envoy Nakayama and Deputy Foreign Minister Ardebili)'

A telegram from Charge d'Affaires Tanabe to the Foreign Minister summarizing a meeting between Special Envoy Nakayama and Deputy Foreign Minister Ardebili at the Iranian Foreign Ministry to discuss the relationship between Japan and Iran, and the release of the American hostages in Lebanon.

1946

Letter, Ya. Malik to Cde. V.M. Molotov

In this undated memo, written sometime after July 1946, Malik informs Molotov that he has completed a new draft directive for the Soviet delegation in the Joint Soviet-American Commission cconcerning Korea.

May 31, 1946

Report on the Work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission to Implement the Moscow Decision of the Three Ministers concerning Korea

The Soviet delegation proposed procedures for the work of the Joint Commission on Korea and the terms for consultation with parties and public organization; specifically, it called for the Commission to consult and only listen to parties and organizations of Korea that agreed with the Moscow Decision. The American delegation refused this demand, causing lengthy disputes. A list of parties and public organizations from both South Korea and North Korea for the consultation were drawn, but the right-wing parties in the Democratic Chamber, the administrative body of South Korea, opposed the Moscow decision and Joint Commission decision, and the discussion associated with the formation of a Provisional Korean Government was halted.

December 6, 1946

Report from General-Colonel T. Shtykov to Cde. I.V. Stalin and Cde. V.M. Molotov

Shytkov concludes that the Soviet delegation cannot back down from its demands for the parties in Korea to support the Moscow decision. A reversal of this position, Shtykov writes, would lead to the domination of US-backed, right-wing parties to take control over the Provisional Government of Korea.

September 15, 1981

Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Instructions for the U.S. delegation to the IAEA's annual General Conference (GC) which told them to anticipate a “severe attack” against Israel by objecting “vigorously [to] suspension of technical aid.” Later on, this instruction would change, and the delegation would be instructed to leave the building should the Israeli credentials be rejected.

June 7, 1981

Attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Research Centre, 7 June 1981: Statement by the Director General

After the raid Israel initiated a PR campaign, explaining its reasoning behind the attack. Following this campaign, the second causality of the raid, in addition to Iraq’s reactor, was the credibility of the IAEA. And its officials staged their own counter campaign.

Pagination