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June 11, 1981	Telegram from Washington Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Evron-the President' The Israelis were concerned and disappointed by the administration’s initial response to the raid, which consisted of a freeze on the shipment of F-16 jets to Israel until a legal review was conducted. The Israeli ambassador to Washington conveyed this sentiment to President Reagan in a meeting on 11 June 1980 in this telegram.
June 11, 1981	Memorandum for Richard V. Allen from Robert M Kimmitt, Subject: Israeli Strike -- Legal Aspects This NSC memo examines some of the legal aspects of the raid. It states that the administration should determine “[W]hether a substantial violation has occurred”, as this would reflect on the delivery of Israel’s F-16 jets.
June 10, 1981	Telegram from Washington Embassy to Foreign Office The Israeli embassy in Washington learned from Haig as well as from another contact that Secretary of Defense Weinberger supports a tough approach to Israel, including a a UNSC resolution that would demand Israel to open the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona for inspection and a call for Israel to join the NPT.
June 10, 1981	Telegram from Washington embassy to Foreign Office, Subject: Evron-Haig The Israeli embassy in Washington learned from Haig as well as from another contact that Secretary of Defense Weinberger supports a tough approach to Israel, including a UNSC resolution that would demand Israel to open the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona for inspection and a call for Israel to join the NPT.
June 9, 1981	Telegram from Washington Embassay to Foreign Office, Subject: administration response Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who maintained close ties with the Israeli diplomats, told the Israeli ambassador in a phone conversation on 9 June 1981 that Israel’s action in Baghdad caused a serious complication for the U.S., reiterating that “President Reagan thinks the same”.
June 7, 1981	Memorandum for Mr. Richard V. Allen from L. Paul Bremer, III, ‘NSC Discussion Paper: Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Cooperation’ On 7 June 1981, the day of the Osirak raid, a policy paper composed by the ‘Senior Interagency Group on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Cooperation’ (SIG) was submitted to the NSC. The discussion paper crowned the administration’s nonproliferation efforts as a “key foreign policy objective” and called to revise the 1978 NNPA.
December 1, 1980	Recommendation for the Reagan Administration Nonproliferation Policy Following Reagan’s election in November 1980, his transition team in charge of nuclear matters called for a clean, dramatic break from the policies of the outgoing Carter administration. As for relations with the IAEA, a vital component of the policy, the ACDA paper argued that Washington should employ the agency as an agent to achieve its nonproliferation goals. The IAEA and the NPT were to be “further strengthened and given greater U.S. support.” To reinforce U.S. influence over the agency, it was recommended that “support to the IAEA in the form of financial contribution, manpower and technical advice should be increased significantly.
June 21, 1971	Transcript of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and William Attwood American journalist William Attwood asks Premier Zhou whether the primary obstacle between the U.S. and China is Taiwan, how China plans to reunify with Taiwan, and how China plans to address differences in living standards after reunification. Zhou says that China's stance on the Taiwan issue is that Taiwan belongs to China and the U.S. should not to interfere in China's domestic matters, withdraw its armed forces from the Taiwan straits, and respect China's sovereignty. Zhou believes that living standards will only be improved when Taiwan reunifies with the mainland.
April 14, 1971	[Zhou Enlai's] Conversation with the U.S. Table Tennis Delegation Zhou Enlai speaks with President of the U.S. Table Tennis Association, Graham Steenhoven, after the 31st annual World Table Tennis Championships. Steenhoven thanks Premier Zhou for inviting the U.S. ping-pong team and U.S. journalists to China. U.S. journalists ask Zhou to comment on the American hippie movement. Steenhoven extends an invitation to the Chinese ping-pong team to visit the U.S.
November 30, 1965	Transcript of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Jean Chauvel Premier Zhou and a representative from the French foreign ministry, Jean Chauvel, talk about the Vietnam War. Zhou voices China's support for Vietnamese people's requests for U.S. troops to withdraw from Vietnam and not interfere in Vietnamese internal issues. Zhou says that the U.S. has not comply to Vietnam's request and has on the contrary expanded the war. Chauvel agrees with Zhou that the final decision about the Vietnamese War should be made by Vietnamese people. Chauvel says that the priority should be to stop the current war and calls for a ceasefire to solve the issue. Zhou cites the U.S. expansion of troops and continued involvement in Vietnam as the cause of heightened tension in Vietnam War.