1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
North America
Middle East
Western Europe
East Asia
-
1923-
1909- 1994
1925-
1917- 1963
April 21, 1967
This document detailed West German suggestions which Washington incorporated into the NPT draft.The cover memorandum reviewed the sources of West German discontent with the NPT.
April 20, 1967
A message from the Bonn embassy highlighted an issue that had been raised by West German diplomats and which Ambassador McGhee correctly believed represented thinking at the top: Chancellor Kiesinger’s objection to an NPT “of unlimited duration.”
April 12, 1967
In this conversation, Director Foster and Norwegian Ambassador Gunneng discussed the state of the NPT negotiations and the U.S. consultations with West Germany. Foster made comments about Italy and West Germany being inflexible, and Gunneng stated that it would cost the country "a great deal internationally" if they continued to block progress.
April 7, 1967
During his meeting with French president de Gaulle, Vice President Humphrey said that Washington knew the “French position” of opposition to the NPT, but wanted to know what de Gaulle thought the “German attitude” should be.
March 27, 1967
During this conversation, Director Foster briefed Vice President Humphrey about the progress of the NPT. Foster said that he was willing to meet Germany’s concerns about such issues as protecting its civil nuclear industry and a future European federation. Moreover, noting that Washington had to discuss the NPT with other countries that could “otherwise go nuclear,” Foster worried that a long delay caused by consultations could “jeopardize the chance of the rest of the world getting signed up.”
March 21, 1967
In this Airgram, the U.S. embassy in Bonn sent a translation of Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin's tough statement on the NPT at a press conference in London. Kosygin stated (of West Germany) "whether she wants this or not, such a document should be signed, because we will not allow the Federal Republic of Germany to possess nuclear weapons."
March 10, 1967
To try to strengthen West German confidence, ACDA director William C. Foster met with Chancellor Kiesinger, who expressed concern about the danger of “erosion” and “uncertainty” in U.S.-West German relations and the need for more time for consultations. Kiesinger’s “own idea was that it would have been better …to have discussed all aspects of non-proliferation ‘behind locked doors’ before any intention of signing the treaty had become public.”
February 22, 1967
As an assurance to the Germans and other NATO allies, ACDA and the State Department drew up a memorandum on the interpretation of the NPT draft treaty. The key point was that the treaty “deals only with what is prohibited, not what is permitted.”
January 17, 1967
Information about the recent U.S.-West German discussions had leaked to the press and in this conversation, Vorontsov “wanted to know what we had told the Germans with respect to participation in a European nuclear force.” Bunn told him that the “Germans were concerned that nothing in the treaty stand in the way of steps which might ultimately produce a United States of Europe.”
January 13, 1967
In this conversation, ACDA director Foster met with Ambassador Knappstein for an extended discussion of the NPT. Topics included the treaty’s compatibility with a future European federation, consultations by the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, the definition of a nuclear weapon, and the prohibition of national control over “peaceful nuclear explosives.”