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Documents

November 19, 1966

India Department of Atomic Energy, 'Cooperation with USA in the Development of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes'

Packet of material prepared by the Department of Atomic Energy regarding research cooperation with the United States. Includes a letter from Glenn Seaborg, Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, a letter from Myron B. Kratzer, of the Division of International Affairs, and a draft of the research agreement.

August 13, 1964

India Department of Atomic Energy, Minutes of a Meeting Held August 1, 1964 Regarding the Fourth Five Year Plan Requirements

Minutes from a meeting headed by Homi Bhabha regarding research and development requirements for atomic energy for the department's Fourth Five Year Plan. Includes the budget and research topics for various divisions of nuclear research.

April 30, 1968

India Department of Atomic Energy, Press Release, 'India and the USSR Sign Protocol for Collaboration in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

A press release from the Indian Department of Atomic Energy announcing that the Soviet Union would be sending a delegation of scientists to India and summarizes the history of nuclear assistance from the Soviet Union.

March 12, 1966

Speech by Professor M. G. K. Menon, Sheriff's Meeting in Memory of Dr. Homi J. Bhabha at University Gardens, Bombay

Speaking at an event to honor the memory of Homi Bhabha, Professor Menon speaks about his influence on nuclear energy development in India and the creation of the Tata Institute for Fundamental Research.

December 1982

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States'

This CIA report on India, “India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States,” has comparatively few excisions. It discusses in some detail Indian efforts to support its nuclear power and nuclear weapons development program by circumventing international controls through purchases of sensitive technology on “gray markets.” The report depicts a “growing crisis in the Indian civil nuclear program,” which combined with meeting nuclear weapons development goals, was forcing India to expand imports of nuclear-related supplies. The purchasing activities posed a “direct challenge to longstanding US efforts to work with other supplier nations … for tighter export controls.”

July 1982

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Assessment,'India’s Nuclear Program: Energy and Weapons'

This massively excised report indicates the Agency’s strong views about releasing its knowledge of India’s nuclear weapons activities, even when the information is decades old. That many of the pages are classified “Top Secret Umbra” suggests that some of the information draws on communications intelligence intercepts, another highly sensitive matter.

January 20, 1966

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation'

This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

November 1, 1996

Email, Caroline Russell to Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Staff, 'Priority: India Nuclear Debate – Comments from Raja'

Caroline Russell emails her staff at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency regarding Raja Ramanna's recent statements regarding the state of India's nuclear program. Ramanna was the Director of the Defence Research and Development Organisation and was quoted in the Times of India stating that India already had a capability which did not need to be tested.

August 12, 1996

US Embassy in New Delhi Telegram 9250 to State Department, 'Ambassador’s Meeting with Opposition Leader'

Report on US Ambassador to India Frank Wisner's meeting with Indian Opposition Leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and halting any nuclear test. The Ambassador found the meeting unproductive. The CTBT was central to the discussion but it was evident that Vajpayee was not interested and his “body language” indicated that he was inclined to favor a nuclear test. During one point in the discussion, Vajpayee asked, “What if we start underground tests?” According to the embassy’s message, “we interpret his question about testing as indicating that [he] and the BJP would favor a test” and would not be persuaded by U.S. arguments—“reason”—to forego one.

July 8, 1996

Email, Caroline Russell, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to Lawrence Schein, Robert Rochlin, et al

Caroline Russell of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) discusses how the Indian program is not yet ready for a test and that pressure for one is more politically than technically motivated.

Pagination