1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
North America
South Asia
Western Europe
-
1925-
1923-
July 6, 1973
Summary of the 13th NPG meeting in Ankara in May 1973. Italian Minister of Defense, Tanassi, raises the issue of reviewing the process of launching nuclear weapons in order to secure the potential military and political advantages.
January 4, 1973
Document sent by Tanassi (Minister of Defense) to Andreotti (Prime Minister) on the 1973-01-04. Summary of the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in London that includes a discussion about the strategic capabilities of the two blocs, consultation procedures, and recent studies on the possible use of nuclear arms. It raises the question of extending NPG membership to include all alliance members, a suggestion met with a negative response.
May 18, 1972
Speech by the Minister of Defense providing an overview of the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Copenhagen. Focuses on the problems of "when" and "why" of employment of nuclear arms in Europe.
July 18, 1972
Document sent from Minister of Defense Tanassi to Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti. Topics discussed: comparison of strategic forces (NATO and USSR), studies on potential use of nuclear arms by member states, and the problems of internal consultation within NATO.
October 15, 1972
The note suggests that French motives for developing nuclear capabilities are political rather than based on national security considerations. France seeks to insure a key role in global political and military balance, and its behavior creates unfavorable conditions for the development of common European defense.
August 14, 1967
Soviet tests of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) attracted the interest of the US intelligence community because of the unique challenges it posed to defenses. At that point, August 1967, the US had no means to detect a FOBs attack but INR noted that a satellite detection system would be operational during 1970. This was a reference to the secret Defense Support Program (DSP), which would use infrared technology to detect missile launches and reduce any surprise advantage from the FOBs. The Soviets recognized this and later retired their twenty or so ICBMs with FOBs capabilities in 1983.
May 30, 1967
A prospective Chinese MRBM force led INR to consider whether Beijing would believe that it had more freedom of action to step up its involvement in the Vietnam War: it “might feel freer in extending aid to Hanoi and becoming more involved in the war if US pressure on the North Vietnamese seemed to require it.”
April 21, 1967
Not altogether sure whether the Soviets were really committed to the NPT, the fact that the Soviets had been discussing security assurances with the Indians was seen as evidence that Moscow was interested in having a treaty. India was one of the countries that was especially resistant to the NPT and the Soviets were only one of a number of governments, e.g. Canada, which vainly tried to persuade Indira Gandhi to sign on.
April 12, 1967
The Soviets were insisting that article III on safeguards mention only the IAEA but not the European Atomic Energy Community [EURATOM], even though West Germany and other EURATOM members resisted the idea of IAEA inspections in Western Europe. It would take quite a few months before the Article III wording was to everyone’s satisfaction, but the Soviets also objected to US interpretations of the proposed Article II which would permit a nuclear-armed, united Western Europe.
April 14, 1967
INR assessed several recent newspaper articles by Kiichi Saeki, a defense expert close to the government, whose thinking was “noteworthy for [its] frank consideration of Japan’s need for nuclear-defense planning to cope with Communist China’s growing potential.”