Description of the reaction to the Asian-African Conference in both participating countries and capitalist ruled countries.

Chinese Reference Document No. 1 which includes the following articles:

Ike says to correspondents that the USA is willing to hold direct negotiations with New China
Britain wishes to be a loyal mediator between New China and the USA
Burmese newspapers’ comments on Taiwan issue
Nehru, Nasir and others speak to correspondents in Calcutta
Menzies’s comments on Zhou Enlai’s proposal
Kotalawela’s comment on the Asian-African Conference
USA and Red China
Bright prospect
Bright prospect
The Five States of the Colombo Conference and the USA
Comments of the prime ministers of India, Pakistan and Egypt on the Asian-African Conference
The Bandung Conference
The Five States of the Colombo Conference and the USA.
Allen’s comments on the Asian-African Conference
Pakistan and Egypt on the Asian-African Conference

Describes training techniques used by the KGB in logistical preparation of their operatives for assignments abroad. This article focuses on the employment history of the KGB agent codenamed “Halef.” Between 1955 and 1967, Halef was stationed in Hong Kong and Tokyo. In 1967, due to his insignificant feedback and a weak performance as a field operative, Halef was transferred back as a trainer. As a trainer, Halef traveled extensively. While in the United States, the KGB developed a fictitious identity for Halef – a so-called legend-biography – in case his activity aroused suspicion and he were detained by authorities. In the United States, France and Mexico, Halef’s objectives included developing and testing means of communication with the KGB, which could be used to inform the KGB of an operative’s arrival to and departure from a country, request a meeting, or announce an emergency. In addition to assessing the existing signal language used among operatives, the KGB also instructed Halef to collect the data necessary to set up new surveillance locations in a number of countries. In 1977, Halef was performing assignments in Pakistan and Burma. In 1978, he and his wife were engaged in assignments throughout the USSR. From the USSR, they were relocated to the GDR and then to Bulgaria, where they boarded a cruise ship going from Varny to Suhumi to survey the ports of the Black Sea basin. Traveling through Odessa, Halef photographed military vessels and observed the procedures of the border patrol and customs officers.

Zhou Enlai informed the Chinese government that his purposes of visiting India were to prepare the signing of an Asian peace and to build peace in the Indochina area. He also stated his plans regarding the negotiations of several treaties. The Chinese government agreed with his plans.

Zhou Enlai and U Nu first talked about the decision made on the Geneva Conference regarding the armistice in the Korean Peninsula and the role of the US in it. Then they talked about the elements that complicated the Sino-Burmese relations and the need for building mutual trust and signing a non-political agreement. They also discussed the principles they would have in a joint statement before the signing of this potential agreement.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry reported Indonesia’s intention to hold the Asian-African Conference, its attitude towards the Asian-African Conference, and the possible development of the Conference.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry reported that Indonesia’s intention to hold the Asian-African Conference was to establish a neutral, third group to counter the US and the Soviet Union. It also reported the attitudes of the invited countries and the reactions of the Western countries toward the Conference. It concluded that it would be beneficial for China to participate in the Conference and to influence the political situation in the Conference.

The agenda of the Bogor Conference was to determine the purposes, timing, and participants of the Asian-African Conference. The five Southeast Asian countries agreed that China and Japan should participate in the Asian-African Conference, but some countries also insisted on the participation of US allies such as Thailand and the Philippines.

Mao, via Zhou Enlai, informs Stalin of the position China means to take the discussion of the Korean question at the UN. Mao also asks Stalin’s advise about whether or not to sign non-aggression pacts with India and Burma.