1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
1898- 1976
East Asia
1912- 1994
1893- 1976
Southeast Asia
1898- 1974
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1901- 1972
October 19, 1950
Zhou Enlai gives instructions to the Chinese embassy in North Korea, stating that the main purpose of the embassy’s work is keeping in contact with the North Korean government and following the North Korean government’s actions.
October 14, 1950
Zhou Enlai requests military equipment and support for Chinese operations from the Soviet side, and asks for instructions on solving the issue of command relationships between the North Korean, Chinese, and Soviet forces.
October 7, 1950
Zhou Enlai informs Ambassador Ni Zhiliang that questions about North Korea battle operations have been discussed with Pak Il-u, making further disclosure of opinions with the North Korean side unnecessary.
October 5, 1950
Zhou Enlai gives instructions to pay attention to the northern advance of the South Korean army and the retreat of the North Korean army, and to collect information on the 12th Division's occupation of Wonju. He also notes Pak Il U's return to North Korea.
October 4, 1950
Zhou Enlai instructs the Chinese military officer observation group not to go south of the 38th parallel, but to split into two groups and examine the situations of different areas of Korea.
Zhou Enlai gives instructions on the mobilization of Korean drivers in the northeast.
October 2, 1950
Zhou Enlai notifies Ambassador Ni Zhiliang about the estimated arrival of Pak Il-u and advises Kim Il Sung to order the troops that were cut off by the opposing side and have no way to retreat to persist in guerrilla actions where they are.
October 1, 1950
China advises Kim Il Sung to have the North Korean armies retreat north of the 38th parallel as quickly as possible after the First Front Army was cut off by the opposing side.
September 29, 1950
China approves of Kim Il Sung's request to build warehouses and factories in China and Korea and agrees to recruit Korean drivers for him in the northeast.
September 20, 1950
China approves of Kim Il Sung's idea of fighting a protracted war, and gives advice on military strategies that will make a protracted war possible.
