Skip to content

Results:

51 - 54 of 54

Documents

June 22, 1954

Minutes, Zhou Enlai’s Meeting with Jean Chauvel

Chauvel confirms a meeting for Zhou with the French Prime Minister, and suggests that both countries announce the meeting at the same time to thwart distorted media coverage of the two countries. The two agree that the conference must continue. Also, Chauvel hands Zhou a proposal for a special committee to decide the composition of the supervisory committee.

June 23, 1954

Record of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Pierre Mendès-France

Mendes-France and Zhou discuss the Indochina issue during their first meeting together. Both men feel they are in agreement with each other regarding several points (establishing a cease-fire before discussing political issues, that no US military bases should be established in Indochina, elections in Cambodia and Laos, cooperation between France and Vietnam and between the two sides in Vietnam). They end on a positive note, both certain that their few differences of opinion will be worked out.

March 2, 1954

'Preliminary Opinions on the Assessment of and Preparation for the Geneva Conference,' Prepared by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (drafted by PRC Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai) [Excerpt]

Zhou discusses the need to make agreements at the Geneva conference in order to open a path for discussion and negotiation with the west. Zhou notes that because the US, France and Britain are not united in their opinions, the CCP must hold fast to their positions on the peaceful unification of Korea, and of peace in Indochina. Finally, Zhou suggests that the CCP prepare to discuss issues of trade, relaxing international tensions, and breaking the US embargo, although these issues are not on the agenda.

January 10, 1955

Cable from Feng Xuan, 'Reaction of Britain, United States, France towards the Kuala Lumpur Five Countries inviting China to attend the Afro-Asian Conference'

The UK responded the decision of inviting China to attend the Asian-African Conference with anger, stating that countries in the Bogor Conference had wrong expectations toward China. The US feared that China would have great influence on the Asian-African Conference and thus weaken US influence in the region. The US and UK also worried that China’s participation would improve China-Japan relations. French press expressed this decision as the evidence of the failure of the US power in Southeast Asia.

Pagination