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Documents

October 21, 1964

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in North Korea, 'Reactions among the North Korean Masses to China's Nuclear Test'

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in North Korea notes North Koreans' positive responses to China's first nuclear weapons test and a downfall of Khrushchev in the Soviet Union

June 15, 1965

Notice of the Members of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research

The Joint Institute for Nuclear Research discusses plans for scientific research and development from 1966 through 1970, and Chinese representatives announce their plan to withdraw from the Joint Institute on 1 July, 1965

September 30, 1965

Minutes of Chairman Mao Zedong and Chairman Liu Shaoqi’s Meeting with the Indonesian Delegation

Chairul Seleh of Indonesia met with Mao and discussed nuclear power, Indonesian economy and industry, Chinese-Indonesian relations, and imperialism.

May 21, 1965

Politburo Talk by Zhou Enlai on Receiving a Group of Central Military Commission Operational Meeting Comrades

Speaking at the Politburo, Zhou Enlai explains how nuclear weapons capabilities have won China newfound admiration in the non-aligned world and instilled fear in the other nuclear powers, particularly the United States and Soviet Union.

May 11, 1965

Letter from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong on the Nuclear Test

Zhou Enlai informs Mao Zedong that favorable weather conditions will allow them to carry out the aerial nuclear test explosion. An official statement for the press has also been prepared.

May 10, 1965

Letter from Zhang Aiping, et al., to Zhou Enlai and Luo Ruiqing on the Nuclear Test

On May 10, Chinese military officials confirm that they are prepared to detonate an aerial nuclear explosion but, due to unfavorable weather conditions, must postpone the test until May 12 or 13.

November 3, 1964

Record of Zhou Enlai’s Discussion with British Minister President of the Board of Trade Douglas Jay

Having successfully executed a nuclear test explosion, Zhou Enlai describes the Chinese government’s motivation for pursuing atomic weapons capabilities. Zhou argues that the Three-Nation Treaty (Limited Test Ban Treaty) is insufficient, that the United States remains committed to nuclear proliferation despite the agreement, and that China seeks to end the monopoly that other nuclear powers have thus far exploited. Zhou also calls for the organization of a global, truly equal summit at which to discuss the issue of nuclear weapons testing and proliferation.

October 11, 1964

Letter from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, et al., on the Nuclear Explosion

Zhou Enlai notifies Mao Zedong and other prominent political and military officials that preparations have been made to detonate the explosion between October 15 and 20, depending on weather conditions. Attention is also given to the high level of secrecy surrounding the explosion, methods of data collection, publicity, and the political consequences of the explosion.

September 21, 1964

Letter from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong on the Nuclear Explosion

Zhou Enlai offers multiple dates on which the first nuclear test explosion may take place and asks Mao Zedong for his preference.

September 5, 1963

Zhou Enlai’s Discussion with a Kenyan African National Federation Delegation (Excerpt)

Zhou Enlai criticizes the Three-Nation Treaty (Limited Test Ban Treaty) of 1963, arguing that it signifies an attempt by the US, UK, and USSR to monopolize nuclear weapons. Enlai warns that the agreement will allow larger nuclear countries to commit “nuclear blackmail” against smaller, non-nuclear countries.

Pagination