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Documents

May 25, 1965

Memorandum of Conversation between Senior Cuban Communist Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCz) official Vladimir Koucky, Prague, 25 May 1965

Rodriguez met with Koucky to clarify misunderstandings which could possibly arise because the reasons were not explained for Cuba’s positions on issues of the international communist movement, and for speeches and statements of some leading Cuban comrade.

April 9, 1965

Czech Record of Talks with the Deputy Chairman of the Cuban Revolutionary Government, Raul Castro

Meeting between Raul Castro, Bohumir, Lomsky, and Langer. Castro informed Lomsky that internal danger has been eliminated, and contra-revolutionary and anti-government groups operating directly in Cuba have been broken up and practically destroyed. They evaluated the strategy of the cuba's defense, revised operational plans, and carried out number of changes. They originally approached the CSSR with a plea for a shipment of 200 pieces of 30 mm double cannons. The current situation, however (especially the situation in the DRV), is forcing them to ask for 30 mm cannons again.

April 16, 1965

Czechoslovakian Report on Visit of Cuban Delegation and Talks with Minister of National Defense, Bohumir Lomsky

Report on visit of Cuban Delegation in Czechoslovakia and conversation on 16 April 1965. This document contains information about visit of the Czechoslovak military delegation in Cuba on 30 March - 9 April 1965. There are attachments to the document: draft of the resolution, the report, report on important conversations in connection with the visit. The visit occurred at the time of heightened acts of aggression of the USA against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and thus it was regarded as highly important in Cuba. It contributed to strengthening of Cs. Cuban friendship and to strengthening of the friendship in arms of our armies.

November 29, 1962

Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United States (Dr. Miloslav Ruzek), Report on Anastas Mikoyan’s Conversations in Washington

The report details Mikoyan's talks with President John F. Kennedy in Washington D.C. Among the topics of discussion were questions of hemispheres of influence, whether the Soviet Union promoted a revolution against the USA in Cuba, and whether Castro was made an enemy of the USA or was one from the beginning. Conduct of both nations with regards to the Cuban question is discussed at length, ranging from whether U.S. was correct in acting against a perceived threat to security, the conduct of the Cuban people, the extent of Soviet involvement in Cuba, and what military hardware would be left in Cuba after the removal of the nuclear missile bases.

October 31, 1962

Cable no. 338 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Pavlicek reports to Prague that the public situation in Cuba is still uncertain and confused. Castro is expected to give a speech the coming Thursday which would resolve the situation and clarify the position of the Soviet Union. There is a lack of depth in evaluation, and much needs to be explained to the Cuban population by the Soviet Union, as all fear aggressive action by the United States.

October 30, 1962

Minutes of Conversation between the Delegations of the CPCz and the CPSU, The Kremlin (excerpt)

In this conversation between Khrushchev and Novotny, Khrushchev used exceptionally candid language to defend his handling of the superpower confrontation, what he described as “six days which shook the world.” While well aware that many fellow communists (including the Chinese and Cubans) regarded his agreement under pressure from US President John F. Kennedy to remove the missiles as a surrender to the imperialists, Khrushchev stoutly defended his action as not only a necessary measure to avoid a catastrophic nuclear war, but actually a victory. Khrushchev bluntly criticized Fidel Castro for failing to comprehend the true nature of war in the thermonuclear age and, that at the height of the crisis, he had suggested in a letter to Khrushchev that the Soviets should be the first to use nuclear weapons, striking the United States should it attack Cuba, even though this would lead promptly to a global war.

October 30, 1962

Cable no. 335 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Pavlicek reports there is an apparent rift between Cuban Foreign Ambassador Roa and Soviet Premier Khrushchev on the orders to dismantle the missile sites. Roa believes the people will not understand and misinterpret this step by the Soviets, as well as the Soviet Union losing international prestige. Fidel Castro plans to make a speech on public television to clarify the whole situation. Castro also made clear his paranoia about the United States not holding up to their promises and was convinced an invasion was still imminent.

October 29, 1962

Cable no. 333 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Pavlicek informs Prague that negotiations have proceeded with some progress, while there is still a tense aura in the air. An invasion of Cuba by the United States is now an unlikely prospect, given American failures to penetrate Cuban airspace, the quick organized response of the Cuban armed forces, and the widespread support Cuba receives from the socialist countries of the world. Pavlicek promises the Czechoslovak government that the embassy will make all necessary provisions to providing information on the ongoing negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

October 28, 1962

Cable no. 332 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Pavlicek writes of a breakthrough with the UN Secretary General and Cuba with regards to ending the crisis; Castro is willing to enter into settlements to resolve the crisis peacefully, on the condition that Cuba's sovereignty and security not be infringed by the United States. Preparations are being made for Cuban foreign minister Raul Roa to fly to the UN Security Council meeting.

October 28, 1962

Cable no. 330 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Pavlicek writes of the negotiations between Khrushchev and Kennedy and of the Cuban people's reaction to them, which is mixed. Among the higher ranking intelligentsia, there is a suspicion that Cuba's defenses will be weakened. Among the lower-level staff, Khrushchev is met with trust and understanding. The Czechoslovak Press Agency is to publish the events in favor of the Soviet Union, portraying it as forcing the United States to negotiate.

Pagination