In this meeting, The IKV responds to NATO discussions about a possible introduction of the 'N-bomb' [neutron bomb]. The neutron bomb would will probably be introduced; however the IKV needs to do all that it can to prevent its arrival.

In this letter, Faber asks Boskma to write a pamphlet for the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) about nuclear weapons and to help think about IKV’s strategy against these weapons for an upcoming campaign. Even though direct action is the new and primary strategy for the campaign, writing publications is identified by IKV president Ter Veer as "one of the most important tasks of the peace movement."

This "first attempt at an outline" is the start of a process to compose a new, general vision for the IKV, first one after the Sta of 1972. Important themes other than the nuclear arms race include development cooperation and human rights.

Diplomat A.J. Meerburg writes to activist Mient Jan Faber about nuclear proliferation and disarmament issues, illustrating the amiable relations that developed between social activists and national security professionals and activists in the Netherlands.

Meeting minutes showing the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense's respective interests in the IKV and Pax Christi's "small-steps-theory," a theory on gradual disarmament through a series of small unilateral steps. Includes discussion concerning a proposal to form a study group of both interested civil servants and peace activists to formulate an alternative policy.

This document provides an extensive analysis and critique of the balance of nuclear deterrence. Analysis includes objections to the balance of nuclear deterrence theory. This marks the first time that the IKV ever articulated such objections.

Memorandum presented at 11 October 1963 meeting of the Dutch Council of Ministers. The memorandum is highly critical of the military merits of the proposed NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force, and argues that even if the MLF is created, the Netherlands should decline to participate.

Paper presented at 4 October 1963 meeting of the Dutch Council of Ministers. The paper lays out the reasons for declining to participate in the Multilateral Force so far, but argues that due to changes in the situation – principally a turn on the part of the British toward participation – the Netherlands now should move to participate in the talks. The paper lists the (political) advantages of such participation.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns reports that the Secretary of State Rusk has asked him to explain the American position regarding the Multilateral Force (MLF) to Prime Minister Khrushchev on his impending visit to Russia. The main point is that the MLF is not intended to give Germany control over nuclear weapons.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns reports on a discussion he had with Jean Monnet on the EEC and the Multilateral Force (MLF), including topics such as the interconnection between these issues, the risk of a German nuclear force, and transatlantic relations in general. Luns also met with Undersecretary of State Ball, who was keen on moving ahead with the MLF and proposed holding a conference about it in The Hague, which Luns had to decline. Luns furthermore met with Minister of Foreign Affairs Couve de Murville, who put the blame with the Americans for inciting thoughts about nuclear independence on the part of the Germans. Minister of Defense De Jong responds by giving a broad military-strategic analysis, concluding that unity within NATO is essential to prevent American attention from shifting increasingly to Asia.