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November 23, 1977

Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), Report of the IKV Meeting of 23 November 1977

In this meeting, The IKV responds to NATO discussions about a possible introduction of the 'N-bomb' [neutron bomb]. The neutron bomb would will probably be introduced; however the IKV needs to do all that it can to prevent its arrival.

March 18, 1977

Letter from Mient Jan Faber to Peter Boskma of the Technical University of Twente

In this letter, Faber asks Boskma to write a pamphlet for the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) about nuclear weapons and to help think about IKV’s strategy against these weapons for an upcoming campaign. Even though direct action is the new and primary strategy for the campaign, writing publications is identified by IKV president Ter Veer as "one of the most important tasks of the peace movement."

June 9, 1976

Letter from A.J. Meerburg to Mient Jan Faber of the Interchurch Peace Council

Diplomat A.J. Meerburg writes to activist Mient Jan Faber about nuclear proliferation and disarmament issues, illustrating the amiable relations that developed between social activists and national security professionals and activists in the Netherlands.

November 12, 1975

Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), Report of the Meeting of 12 November 1975

Meeting minutes showing the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense's respective interests in the IKV and Pax Christi's "small-steps-theory," a theory on gradual disarmament through a series of small unilateral steps. Includes discussion concerning a proposal to form a study group of both interested civil servants and peace activists to formulate an alternative policy.

January 1972

Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) Internal Paper, 'The Power of Europe'

This document provides an extensive analysis and critique of the balance of nuclear deterrence. Analysis includes objections to the balance of nuclear deterrence theory. This marks the first time that the IKV ever articulated such objections.

February 14, 1964

Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'Multilateral Nuclear Force'

The Council decides to participate in the NATO Multilateral Force test ship (the Mixed-Manning Demonstration, or MMD). Among the arguments that persuade the Minister of Defense is the danger of shifting the center of gravity to the German Federal Republic and the concomitant risk of giving Russia the impression that the whole project is a guise for providing the Germans with nuclear weapons.

July 24, 1963

Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 24 July 1963

Boissevain reports on Fidel Castro. During a banquet held by the Egyptian ambassador, Castro speaks to Swiss Ambassador Masset of a decision to nationalize the former building of the U.S. embassy, currently in use by the Swiss embassy acting as U.S. representatives. Castro is noted as having "the air of one who is boasting to a trusted friend about how he has crossed an opponent." Boissevain thinks it best to keep on Castro's good side and requests an illustrated work of the Netherlands to be sent as a gesture of goodwill.

March 19, 1963

Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 19 March 1963

Boissevain writes of the continued presence of Russian military and economic advisors in Cuba, which are causes for concern. The ongoing question is for how long they will remain in Cuba and when do they leave. Boissevain says that last week approximately 1,000 advisors left the country, but with some note of resistance. However, the departure for them is a great relief for the average Cuban and Russian alike.

November 7, 1962

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 7 November 1962

The cable focuses on a report from the German embassy that in several places in Cuba, Soviet weapons are hidden under cement. There is still no progress on the dialogue between Fidel Castro and Anastas Mikoyan.

November 1, 1962

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 1 November 1962

Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen sends a cable on a conversation he had with a member of the U.S. State Department. Firstly, the State Department was pleased to know Indonesian President Sukarno had not pledged support to Cuba during the crisis. Secondly, they hoped to make the point to Sukarno how alliance with the Soviets could not be relied upon, as the Cuban crisis and the Soviet abandonment of India have demonstrated. Thirdly, the Indonesian Ambassador Zain was going to pay six week visit to Jakarta, in an effort to promote U.S. economic support to Indonesia.

Pagination