A brief note suggests that the 12-page note sent to the Ministry by the North Korean Embassy in Prague should be returned as if never read. The 31 October 1967 North Korean note, introduced by a brief letter in English and provided both in French and in Korean, deals with U.S. imperialism and the risk of war it entails.

Boissevain reports on Fidel Castro. During a banquet held by the Egyptian ambassador, Castro speaks to Swiss Ambassador Masset of a decision to nationalize the former building of the U.S. embassy, currently in use by the Swiss embassy acting as U.S. representatives. Castro is noted as having "the air of one who is boasting to a trusted friend about how he has crossed an opponent." Boissevain thinks it best to keep on Castro's good side and requests an illustrated work of the Netherlands to be sent as a gesture of goodwill.

Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns responds to Boissevain's two cables regarding Castro's proposal for an agreement with the United States. Luns is wary of Castro's request to use the Boissevain as the mediator, and urges caution and reserve. He asks Boissevain to keep him updated of any future developments, should Castro make a future proposal.

Boissevain writes in continuation of the previous cable regarding Castro's desire for a mediator in an agreement with the United States. The Swiss or Czech ambassadors are offered as alternatives by Boissevain. Castro also notes that the Cuban debt to the Soviet Union is far to large, although he still wishes to continue revolution, creating this impasse between Cuba and the United States.

Boissevain writes how nationalistic fervor is at the fever pitch in Cuba. He comments on widespread use of slogans and propaganda posters everywhere in Havana and the effects they have on the average Cuban. Despite the end of the military blockade against Cuba, tensions still run high between Castro and Kennedy. The island is now "completely isolated" resulting in severe shipping delays from Europe, if any arrive at all.

Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen sends a cable on a conversation he had with a member of the U.S. State Department. Firstly, the State Department was pleased to know Indonesian President Sukarno had not pledged support to Cuba during the crisis. Secondly, they hoped to make the point to Sukarno how alliance with the Soviets could not be relied upon, as the Cuban crisis and the Soviet abandonment of India have demonstrated. Thirdly, the Indonesian Ambassador Zain was going to pay six week visit to Jakarta, in an effort to promote U.S. economic support to Indonesia.

The meeting of the Council of Ministers at The Hague revolved around the ongoing naval blockade of Cuba by the United States. The Dutch Assistant Secretary of State related that while the Americans are remaining firm on the Cuban situation, his visit to President Kennedy revealed he was very tense and was looking for a solution. The Foreign Ministry has yet to give an definitive stance on Cuba, but the primary concern for the Dutch Government was freedom of the sea and free flow of trade. The Minister of Justice concludes that while the government has no power to stop ships from going to Cuba, it does have the power to bar arms shipments.

An outline of key points made in each of several meetings over a one week period. Includes the following: the Netherlands and Belgium will try to decide as late and as simultaneously as possible on TNF modernization; Italy will try to help the Dutch influence FRG and U.S. positions; U.K. is committed to helping Dutch cabinet remain intact; FRG does not oppose the Dutch move to delay their decision but also believes Netherlands should not try to block NATO decision-making.

Memorandum of an extended one-on-one conversation between the Dutch and Italian Prime Ministers focusing in particular on a description of the reasons for Italy's strong support for TNF modernization as outlined by Cossiga.

A conversation between Dutch Defense Minister Scholten and US Deputy National Security Advisor Aaron in which Aaron outlines and defends the United States' views of the Netherlands' position on TNF modernization.