A memorandum outlining the President's approval of the steps recommended in the Secretary of State's 6/9 memorandum, as well as some caveats.

The National Security Council discusses US considerations of Middle East negotiations, including the Soviet role in the Middle East and their positions on negotiations, repatriation and settlement, and the possibility of negotiating small pieces of an agreement as opposed to direct negotiations.

Instructions to prepare a number of studies for various contingencies in the Middle East, including renewed Arab-Israeli conflict, crises related to Jordan, and US-Soviet confrontation.

US Consular Office William Gibson and Prince Peter of Greece discuss developments in Tibet and Indo-Tibetan trade. Princess Irene offers unflattering views on a group of White Russian refugees who exited Xinjiang via Kalimpong and later immigrated to the United States. In a cover note, Evan M. Wilson dismisses Irene's comments but notes that Prince Peter's information was 'quite accurate.'

Negotiation of a collective security or non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union would "arouse grave anxiety or cynical reserve" due to a number of problems.

Ceasescu, Nixon and Kissinger discuss issues ranging from European security to the situation in the Middle East.

The Soviets were insisting that article III on safeguards mention only the IAEA but not the European Atomic Energy Community [EURATOM], even though West Germany and other EURATOM members resisted the idea of IAEA inspections in Western Europe. It would take quite a few months before the Article III wording was to everyone’s satisfaction, but the Soviets also objected to US interpretations of the proposed Article II which would permit a nuclear-armed, united Western Europe.

Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

Prepared by Edward Hurwitz, a Foreign Service officer and future ambassador then on assignment to INR, this report treated ICBMs as China’s main weapons goal, an eventual means for a “credible threat” to Beijing’s U.S. and Soviet “arch enemies.”

With a nuclear nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Washington, INR considered which countries were likely to sign on and why or why not. INR analysts, mistakenly as it turned out, believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a co-sponsor of a treaty in part because of the “international climate” and also because Moscow and Washington differed on whether a treaty would recognize a “group capability.”