This CIA bulletin notes the failure of U.S.-Argentine nuclear negotiations after Cyrus Vance’s visit to Argentina in December 1977. The U.S. proposed to supply highly enriched uranium for Argentina’s reactor exported to Peru, as well as to approve of a heavy water plant from Canada and asked in exchange for the Argentine ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty as well as the deferral of their spent-fuel reprocessing plans.

This is a CIA assessment of Brazilian nuclear politics a few weeks before President Sarney's visit to the U.S.

This SNIE analyzes Brazilian nuclear politics in the light of the return of civilian rule in the country after 21 years of military rule. It demonstrates a profound knowledge of the military's involvement in the nuclear program.

This estimate is an update of the1984 SNIE, and has more specific considerations on the Alfonsin government and its nuclear policies, capabilities and intentions.

This estimate seeks to analyze the actions of a series of countries, which in the course of 1982-1987 could affect U.S. interests. It analyzes countries with developing nuclear programs in different regions in the world (South Asia, East Asia, Near East, Latin America, and Africa) and their intentions and capabilities in terms of nuclear weapons.

This estimate updates the 1974 predictions, and analyzes the “earliest dates of the technical feasibility of possession of a nuclear device” of the Republic of China, Pakistan, South Africa, The Republic of Korea, Argentina and Brazil, among others.

This memo states that the President has read the report by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee and approved the recommended consultations with other countries. In the memo, Henry Kissinger endorsed consultations with suppliers to establish “common principles regarding the supply of sensitive enrichment technology or equipment” and encouraging multinational frameworks for “enrichment, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing facilities,” among other measures.

Reagan informed Congress that he had “concluded that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device.”

Analysis of the military campaign waged in Southern Angola in 1987-88 as well as the lessons learned from this exchange. Document indicates that FAPLA failed to learn from its mistakes, while UNITA adapted much more effectively to the combat environment it faced in Angola. Although FAPLA managed to hold on to Cuito Cuanavale, its large losses led to a Cuban build-up in Southern Angola, which challenged the existing military balance in the region. This provided new impetus to peace negotiations and resulted in the December 1988 Accords among South Africa, Angola and Cuba.

A Cuban Defense Ministry communiqué details the “heroic defense” by Cuban and Angolan troops of Cuito Cuanavale against a South African onslaught. The brunt of the fighting was done by local Angolan forces, which successfully managed to repel the South African invaders.