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A photo of Henry Kissinger from 1975

Kissinger, Henry

1923-

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North America

United States

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Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

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Middle East

Israel

French Nuclear History

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Nuclear Proliferation

Richard Nixon

Nixon, Richard M. (Richard Milhous)

1913- 1994

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East Asia

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Sino-American Cooperation, 1972-1989

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Mao, Zedong

1893- 1976

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Scowcroft, Brent

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Sonnenfeldt, Helmut

1926-

Israeli Nuclear History

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December 22, 1973	Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger from John A. Froebe, Jr., “Korean West Coast Island Situation" John A. Froebe, Jr., briefs Henry Kissinger on the Northern Limit Line Dispute.
December 3, 1973	Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger from Richard H. Solomon, “The Korean Situation and the China Element" National Security Council staff member Richard H. Solomon advises Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to work with the Chinese in order to respond to North Korea's provocations along the Northern Limit Line
May 18, 1974	State Department cable 104613 to Consulate, Jerusalem, 'India Nuclear Explosion' The day of the test, State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) rushed to update Kissinger. INR provided background on what had happened, how the United States and Canada had inadvertently helped India produce plutonium for the test device, earlier U.S. and Canadian demarches against “peaceful nuclear explosions,” and India’s capabilities to produce and deliver nuclear weapons. The report did not state whether India had made a decision to produce weapons, but it forecast that two large unsafeguarded reactors under construction could eventually “produce enough plutonium for 50-70 nuclear weapons.”
January 16, 1973	H. Daniel Brewster to Herman Pollack, 'Indian Nuclear Developments' The interagency group prepared a response to NSSM 156 on 1 September 1972 and it was sent to Kissinger. The summary of the study reproduced here includes the conclusion that an Indian test would be “a set-back to nonproliferation efforts” and that Washington should “do what [it] can to avert or delay” one. Thus, recommendations included a number of unilateral and multilateral actions that the United States government could take, noting that “given the poor state” of Indo-American relations, an “overly visible” U.S. effort would more likely speed up an Indian decision to test a device, Even non-US efforts were likely not to “be per se effective.”
July 4, 1972	Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, 'Proposed NSSM on the Implications of an Indian Nuclear Test,' with cover memorandum from Richard T. Kennedy National security assistant Henry Kissinger asks President Nixon to approve a proposal for a national security study memorandum [NSSM] on the implications of an Indian nuclear test for U.S. interests.
April 15, 1969	Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to President Nixon, 'Guidance to State and Defense Department on Our Attitude Toward Military Cooperation with the French' Kissinger informs Nixon of a discussion he had with British Defense Minister Denis Healey about French/U.S. military cooperation. Kissinger has told Healey that the French have not approached the U.S., and that any decision to aid France would have to be heavily weighed beforehand. Kissinger and Healey have agreed to inform one another should he be approached for such assistance by France in the future.
April 22, 1969	Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to William P. Rogers, US-French Military Relations This is a follow up of a memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon that was sent on April 15, 1969, where Nixon approved Kissinger to tell the Secretary of State the same points that were discussed in the original memorandum. Such points were that Kissinger has told Healey, British Defense Minister, that the French have not approached the U.S. for military assistance, and that any decision to aid France would have to be heavily weighed beforehand. The necessity for secrecy on these topics is stressed by Kissinger.
June 27, 1969	Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Shriver and the National Security Council, 'Conversation with Schriver on Pompidou Visit, Military Cooperation with France, and Middle East' Ambassador Shriver and Kissinger discuss wanting President Pompidou to visit the U.S. soon, and the former states that he will ask President Nixon to give his opinion on this and to approve it soon. Kissinger further states that he does not know if the President wants to aid France, either militarily or by nuclear means, though he does not think it is out of the question that the President may want to do so. Finally, Kissinger notes that the U.S. does not need French aid in negotiations with the Soviets but would not be opposed to their help in talks with the Israelis.
July 4, 1974	Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry Kissinger, 'US-French Military Cooperation' Sonnenfeldt describes for Secretary Kissinger the state of US-French relations after a schism developed in the wake of the 1973 October War, and what impact this would have on the two countries' nuclear cooperation.
June 23, 1975	National Security Decision Memorandum 299, 'Cooperation with France' Directive from President Ford expanding nuclear safety cooperation with France to include assistance with improving the safety of underground testing. This would involve only information sharing, and "no French nuclear explosive devices of any type may be accepted for test by the US."