Search | Wilson Center Digital Archive

Switch to Visualization

English China Clear All

Related Resources

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

The Taj Mahal Shrine in Agra, India.

South Asia

India

Gyeongbokgung

East Asia

South Korea

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

South Asia

Pakistan

Photograph of Zhou Enlai in 1972.

Zhou, Enlai

1898- 1976

Aerial photograph of CIA headquarters

United States. Central Intelligence Agency

-

China and South Asia

Sino-Soviet Relations

George H.W. Bush and Lech Walesa

CIA Reports on the Collapse of Communism in Europe

Conversations with Zhou Enlai

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Pakistan. Embassy (China)

-

Indian Nuclear History

A photo of Joseph Stalin from 1943

Stalin, Joseph

1879- 1953

Portrait of Mao Zedong from propaganda poster

Mao, Zedong

1893- 1976

Portrait of T.V. Soong, 1945

Soong, T. V. (Tzu-wen)

1894- 1971

Results:

321 - 330 of 362

Display:

Sort By:

Documents

July 1991	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 5-91C, 'Prospects for Special Weapons Proliferation and Control' With the term “weapons of mass destruction” having not yet fully come into general usage, this NIE used the term “special weapons” to describe nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (formerly the term “special weapons” was sometimes used to describe nuclear weapons only). With numerous excisions, including the names of some countries in the sections on “East Asia and the Pacific” and “Central America,” this wide-ranging estimate provides broad-brushed, sometimes superficial, pictures of the situations in numerous countries along with coverage of international controls to halt sensitive technology exports to suspect countries.
September 1985	Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Argentina: Seeking Nuclear Independence: An Intelligence Assessment' According to the 1985 report, the Argentines “have achieved at least a proof of principle of uranium enrichment via gaseous diffusion.” In other words, they had a workable system. Nevertheless, the enrichment plant would not be “fully operational until 1987-1988.” While the assessment of Argentine interest in nuclear weapons did not change, CIA analysts asserted that “Argentina continues to develop the necessary facilities and capabilities that could support a nuclear weapons development effort.”
January 20, 1983	Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 13/32-83, 'Chinese Policy and Practices Regarding Sensitive Nuclear Transfers' With nuclear proliferation a policy priority for the Jimmy Carter administration, and Pakistan already a special concern, the possibility that China and Pakistan were sharing nuclear weapons-related information began was beginning to worry US government officials. These concerns did not go away during the Reagan administration. While nuclear proliferation was not a top priority, the administration was apprehensive about the implications of the spread of nuclear capabilities and that China may have been aiding and abetting some potential proliferators by selling unsafeguarded nuclear materials.
December 7, 1979	Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment, Central Intelligence Agency, Enclosing Report, 'A Review of the Evidence of Chinese Involvement in Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program' With nuclear proliferation a policy priority for the Jimmy Carter administration, and Pakistan already a special concern, the possibility that China and Pakistan were sharing nuclear weapons-related information began was beginning to worry US government officials. They had no hard evidence--and the soft evidence that concerned them is massively excised in the December 1979 report just as Beijing and Washington were normalizing relations—so the “precise nature and extent of this cooperation is uncertain.”
January 20, 1966	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation' This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.
February 26, 1989	Memorandum of Conversation: President Bush's Meeting with Chairman Deng Xiaoping of the People's Republic of China, February 26, 1989, 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon Conversation between Deng Xiaoping and President George Bush on Sino-US relations. Deng expressed the hope that the bilateral relationship would develop in a "new pattern" based on mutual trust, mutual support, and minimizing as much as possible mutual problems. They also discussed the continued tensions between China and the Soviet Union,
December 15, 1995	Draft State Department Telegram to US Embassy Beijing, 'Possible Indian Nuclear Test' The State Department writes to Islamabad urging Pakistan to not react if in fact India chooses to launch a nuclear test. On 15 December the New York Times published a story by Tim Weiner, under the headline “US Suspects India Prepares to Conduct Nuclear Test.” While some Indian journalists and policy experts were convinced that the story was a US government plant, Weiner had simply used due diligence in pursuing a lead from a non-government expert on nuclear proliferation issues. Worried that the story would exacerbate regional tensions by encouraging Pakistan to “act in a manner that jeopardizes our nonproliferation efforts in South Asia,” the Department wanted to enlist the Chinese to encourage the Pakistanis to “exercise restraint in response to these reports.”
May 23, 1953	Letter by United Nations Commander Mark W. Clark to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Solving the Prisoner of War Issue General Clark relays to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff the terms of the United Nations proposal to repatriate prisoners of war captured during the conflict in Korea. The agreement grants prisoners the right to refuse to be repatriated.
July 10, 1951	Letter from General Ridgeway to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a Ceasefire Negotiations in Korea Report from Ridgway, Commander in Chief of the United Nations forces in Korea on meetings between the UN Command and North Korea to negotiate an armistice in Korea.
February 1, 1951	United Nations General Assembly Resolution 498(V) United Nations resolution calling on the People's Republic of China to cease all hostilities on the Korean peninsula.