Recommendations adopted by the National Security Council at the suggestion of the Psychological Strategy Board on covert actions to be undertaken in the Soviet Satellite States. Authorized by the National Security Council, NSC 158 envisaged aggressive psychological warfare to exploit and heighten the unrest behind the Iron Curtain. The policy was endorsed by President Eisenhower on June 26, 1953.

The U.S. state department comments on East German announcement to ease government policies following the East German Uprising. They believe the Soviet Union intends to compromise with Western powers on Germany before the rearmament of the Federal Republic through the European Defense Community plan.

Estimating the current situation and probable developments in East Germany through 1955.

Cable from Samuel Reber to U.S. Department of State Outlining U.S. Perspectives on Four-Power Talks

A CIA report presents an analysis of the dissolution of the Soviet Control Commission (SCC) and the return of V.S. Semyonov to Germany as the Soviet High Commissioner for Germany.

Bohlen informs Dulles of the transfer of Soviet Control in East Germany, which does not yet provide much indication of future Soviet policy in East Germany except the solidification of East Germany's continued existence under the control of the USSR.

According to the CIA report, as of the 19th of June, the situation in East Berlin has been repressed by Soviet troops and the East German police, and inter-sector traffic is strictly controlled. However, in other areas of East Germany, strikes and disturbances are still being reported.

Barnes analyzes developments within the GDR following Stalin’s death. Although there was an initial period of confusion within the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany), it has been confirmed that Ulbricht is now directing SED and is continuing to implement socialization policy, though perhaps less dramatically than in the past. Barnes suggests that the Soviets may also be striving, to some extent, to decrease zonal tension.

Conant suggests that while US policy towards East Germany should, on principle, encourage the “spirit of resistance” brought about by the East German Uprising, it is believed that Communist authorities will continue to use brutal tactics to restrain such resistance, and therefore US initiatives towards the situation should be restrained as to not provide East German authorities an opportunity for more brutal repressions of the population.

Additional suggestions for US sponsored courses of action with regard to the popular uprising in East Germany and East Berlin. While the State Department (GER) did not include these suggestions in the press guidance paper prepared, GER officers suggested several additional ideas during conversation, which were included in the memorandum.