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Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

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Western Europe

France

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

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Western Europe

Great Britain

The Palace of the Republic (Palast der Republik) in Berlin

Eastern Europe

East Germany

"The Bundeshaus (Federal Building) in Bonn, West Germany, May 1961. "

Western Europe

West Germany

Aerial photograph of CIA headquarters

United States. Central Intelligence Agency

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George H.W. Bush and Lech Walesa

CIA Reports on the Collapse of Communism in Europe

Nuclear Proliferation

A photo of Henry Kissinger from 1975

Kissinger, Henry

1923-

French Nuclear History

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United States. Executive Office of the President

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Sonnenfeldt, Helmut

1926-

Berlin Wall between Mitte and Kreuzberg

Berlin Wall

Mikhail Gorbachev, 1986

Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich

1931- 2022

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Rush, Kenneth

1910-

Truman with Attlee and Stalin at Potsdam

Cold War Origins

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Documents

February 22, 1972	Memorandum of Conversation between Richard Nixon and Zhou Enlai
September 23, 1977	State Department telegram 229507 to U.S. Embassy London et al., 'Nuclear Suppliers Meeting – Assessment' This document describes the progress made up to that point and the various concerns of countries within the group regarding the scale of safeguards, particularly from the French and Germans. The NSG also agreed to make the guidelines available to the IAEA so that it could publish them. The State Department had been reluctant to publish them, not least because they did not include full scope safeguards, but overriding that was an interest in dispelling Third World concerns about a “secret cartel.”
May 3, 1977	State Department telegram to U.S. Embassy London et al., 'Nuclear Suppliers Meeting, April 28-29, 1977' This document describes the meeting of 15 nuclear supplier states in London where issues were discussed such as full-scope safeguards, including sanctions in the guidelines, purpose of supplier consent, moratoriums, enlargement of membership, and various countries' individual concerns were voiced and addressed.
November 12, 1976	London Embassy telegram 18324 to State Department, 'London Nuclear Suppliers’ Meeting, November 11 – 12' This telegram describes what the nuclear suppliers' countries accomplished during their November 11-12 meeting. Continued discussions of safeguards and enlarging the group, and agreed that they would wait on publishing results until after their next meeting, which was scheduled to be the following March in London.
June 11, 1976	George Vest to the Secretary of State, 'London Nuclear Suppliers Meeting' This document provides an overview of the London Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting which included the addition of the five newest countries to the original seven. Most old and new members were receptive when Washington lobbied them to support a “long term and stable regime of restraint” on the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. While the French were supportive of the moratorium proposal, the Germans were uncomfortable with it, not least because of the implications for their deal with Brazil.
October 10, 1975	George Vest to Mr. Sonnenfeldt, 'British Comprehensive Safeguards Initiative re Suppliers Conference' This document describes the differing views regarding safeguards. The Canadians strongly supported the former, “full scope safeguards” (their terminology, which caught on), which the French saw as “tantamount to imposing NPT obligations”--a reference to the Treaty’s Article III--which they would not accept. Arguing that full-scope safeguards was “alien to [their] philosophy,” the French suggested that a “traditional interpretation of the contamination principle (i.e., requiring safeguards on any materials produced in exported facilities),” would make it possible to achieve “the practical equivalent” of the Canadian proposal.
June 19, 1975	U.S. Embassy London telegram 9376 to State Department, 'Nuclear Export Policy: Bilaterals with FRG' The U.S. delegation agreed to develop a policy paper that would take into account French and other views so as to reach agreement on the most “stringent” safeguards possible. A central but divisive issue was whether safeguards should apply to the entire nuclear fuel cycle (later known as “full-scope” safeguards). Another issue was whether multinational auspices for reprocessing and enrichment plants should be mandatory or a matter of discretion by a supplier country.
March 26, 1975	State Department memorandum, 'Nuclear Suppliers Conference/French Participation' This memo describes the details of the nuclear suppliers' conference, specifically the details of French participation. Cites the need for common understanding regarding nuclear exports is needed and therefore invites Great Britain, the Soviet Union, West Germany, Japan, and France to participate in the conference. Also details the process of trying to persuade France to participate and dissuading their reluctancy.
December 21, 1974	George H. Springsteen, Jr., Executive Secretary, to Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, 'Briefing Paper on Non-Proliferation' In the course of a background paper on the nuclear proliferation problem and policy options, the State Department updated the White House on the state of play of the nuclear suppliers’ initiative: the British, the Canadians, and the Soviets had agreed to attend a meeting; the Germans would agree “if all key suppliers” (France) accepted; and the Japanese, who had also been asked, had not responded. The French had not given an answer and bilateral discussions would take place to go over the issues.
August 2, 1974	The Secretary's Analytical Staff Meeting on Non-Proliferation Kissinger presided over an important staff meeting in early August where he made a decision to go ahead with the suppliers’ project, beginning with approaches to Moscow and Paris. While noting that the U.S., as a sponsor of the NPT, had a “special responsibility” to curb nuclear proliferation, Kissinger did not believe that it had a unique responsibility