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Western Europe

France

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North America

United States

French Nuclear History

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Western Europe

Great Britain

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

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United States. Executive Office of the President

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Nuclear Proliferation

A photo of Henry Kissinger from 1975

Kissinger, Henry

1923-

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Sonnenfeldt, Helmut

1926-

"The Bundeshaus (Federal Building) in Bonn, West Germany, May 1961. "

Western Europe

West Germany

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United States. Department of State

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National Security Council (U.S.)

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The Palace of the Republic (Palast der Republik) in Berlin

Eastern Europe

East Germany

Pakistani Nuclear History

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Foster, John S.

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Berlin Wall between Mitte and Kreuzberg

Berlin Wall

Truman with Attlee and Stalin at Potsdam

Cold War Origins

South African Nuclear History

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August 28, 1972	Memorandum from Ronald I Spiers to John N. Irwin II, 'Military Cooperation with France: Outcome of the Debré Visit' Discussion of French Minister of Defense Debré's six day visit to the United States in July 1972. The Department of Defense is refusing to share with the Department of State information about technical discussions with Debré's delegation. John Foster, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, may have promised the French "sensitive strategic weapons technology" which cannot be given to them. The French "wish list" of assistance goes beyond the current restrictions to only help with existing systems, and not to provide the French with any new capabilities.
January 9, 1971	Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry A. Kissinger, 'Interim Report on NSSM 100: US–French Military Relations' Sonnenfeldt describes and criticizes National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 100, an issue paper on potential US military aid to France's ballistic missile program. He states that the current version of the study "does not adequately explore" the broader policy implications of such aid, especially in regards to "the direction we wish to take in Europe in the 1970s."
December 1970	Report of the National Security Council Staff, 'NSSM 100 – Military Cooperation with France (Analytical Summary)' A summary and critical commentary on National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 100, an issue paper on potential US military aid to France's ballistic missile program. The report describes the specific French requests for assistance, current US policy restricting such assistance, and outlines options for future cooperation. The options are subdivided into three "approaches" based on the actors involved: 1) Bilateral US-French approaches, 2) NATO-oriented approaches, 3) Anglo-French or European-oriented approaches.
July 27, 1973	Memorandum of Conversation with Robert Galley, July 27, 1973 Transcript of a conversation between French Minister of Armed Forces Galley and U.S. officials, including Kissinger and Schlesinger. Galley says that the French are making progress and have benefited from their talks with Foster. Kissinger notes that the U.S. has a “cooperative spirit” with regards to French foreign policy. Galley notes the advances that have been made by the French and asks for aid with modernization of their forces to bring the French to the same level as the U.S., specifically in regards to missile hardening, underground testing, and submarines, among others. Kissinger notes that now that the French have missile technology, it is in the best interest of the U.S. that it be effective and not become irrelevant, but there is strong opposition not only from abroad but at home, as well. Kissinger wants to know how long the French can keep their advances a secret, and Galley notes that many things have already been kept secret and can continue to be kept as such. They end the discussion with talks about meeting again sometime in August.
August 9, 1973	Memorandum of Conversation, 'French Nuclear Discussion' Transcript of conversation between Kissinger and Schlesinger. Kissinger wants to make Galley "drool" by keeping him interested without actually giving anything up. Kissinger worries about what the British want in terms of Polaris and notes that putting the French on the same footing as the U.S. would scare the British enough to get their point across.
August 17, 1973	Memorandum of Conversation, 'Visit of French Defense Minister Galley; Strategic Programs' Kissinger wants to help the French without giving them too much. Foster thinks that the French have the worst missile program in the world, while the Chinese have the best. He thinks the best thing we can do is to look at their designs and offer suggestions, especially in regards to forming their objectives and planning how to meet them. Foster notes that any help we give to the French is perceived as a full commitment, so Kissinger warns that we must remain “cold-blooded.”
August 24, 1973	Memorandum, from Holsey G. Handyside, Director of Politico-Military Affairs, Office of Atomic Energy and Aerospace, to Seymour Weiss, 'Speculation: Possibility of High Level Contact Between US and French Governments' This speculates on the French/U.S. missile connection and notes that Blancard is probably a key player, having most likely met with officials in Washington. Blancard would have reported any such talks to Galley, and so Schlesinger will need to be properly informed about the situation before meeting with Galley.
August 30, 1973	Scowcroft to Kissinger on the Meeting with Galley Scowcroft briefs Kissinger for his meeting with Galley. This lengthy document includes information on what the French are specifically asking for, the outline for the meeting (as proposed by Kissinger, himself), Foster’s notes for the meeting expanded, and a reminder to discuss underground testing.
August 31, 1973	Memorandum of Conversation with Robert Galley, August 31, 1973 Discussion between Galley and Blancard with Kissinger, Foster and Sonnenfeldt held in secret. Kissigner wishes to give the strategic assessment of France followed by Foster’s specific observances. Kissinger notes that the Soviets are expanding rapidly, and there is a need for a warning system. They discuss the importance of building up a deterrent, and the U.S. thinks it is feasible to assist the French in this regard. The French are asking for clarifications and information on MIRV and MRV. Kissinger discusses how these exchanges are not going through the normal channels, stressing the need for secrecy, though Congressional approval may be needed for some points, and they conclude by setting up a time for Foster to come to France.
September 5, 1973	Memorandum of Conversation—Kissinger and Schlesinger Kissinger and Schlesinger discuss possible concessions to France in light of potential changes in their government. Other topics of discussion include foreign relations with the Middle East, MIRV, and security in Europe.