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Documents

June 4, 1965

Memorandum of Conversation with West German chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 'Nuclear Matters'

In this conversation, Erhard mentioned a briefing by McNamara that detailed U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in the Federal Republic. After Erhard wished that the numbers could be publicly disclosed, Ambassador George McGhee observed that it was “often overlooked that Germany was actually the third largest nuclear country in the world.”

December 7, 1964

Memorandum of Conversation between President Johnson and Prime Minister Harold Wilson

In this conversation, President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson discuss the MLF and the proposed ANF--the "Atlantic Nuclear Force," a British proposal as an alternative to the MLF. The two leaders weighed the pros and cons of both proposals, with President Johnson ultimately deciding to give a positive response to the ANF, leaving it up to the British to see if Bonn could be enlisted.

August 2, 1963

US Embassy Bonn Airgram A-250 to State Department, 'Secretary McNamara’s Conversation with Chancellor Adenauer'

In this conversation, Chancellor Adenauer and Secretary McNamara discussed the West Germans signing the U.S. proposed Limited Test Ban Treaty, which Adenauer felt would be a "success" for the Soviets. Adenauer worried that signing the same documents as the Soviets would recognize the Soviet Occupied Zone.

May 22, 1964

State Department Executive Secretary Benjamin H. Read to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, 'NSAM 241 on Report on French Gaseous Diffusion Plant'

Noting that the situation that gave rise to NSAM 41 had improved, Read informed Bundy that intelligence reporting would continue but he wanted permission to stop work responsive to the NSAM. There had been “no indication of any attempts by the French to enlist German or Italian cooperation in the Pierrrelatte project.”

October 10, 1963

Memorandum of Conversation between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Gromyko, 'Non-Dissemination and the MLF'

In this conversation, President Kennedy and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko discussed the Soviet attitude toward the MLF. Gromyko argued that it would be a barrier to a nonproliferation agreement. Kennedy made the standard argument that “one of the reasons for an MLF was to make it less possible for the Germans to press for nuclear weapons of their own.”

July 5, 1963

Secretary of State Rusk to the President, 'Interim Reply to Your Memorandum of May 30, 1963, for Holders of NSAM 241'

In this memorandum, Secretary of State Rusk noted Minister Lenz’s denials of any German connection with Pierrelatte or any interest in supporting the French weapons program. He declared that the agencies would continue “reviewing allied attitudes toward the Pierrelatte project and possible measures for inhibiting bilateral cooperation.”

June 11, 1963

A.A. Wells, Director of Office of International Affairs, AEC, to Dr. Ragnar Rollefson, Director, Office of International Scientific Affairs, 'Reported Franco-German Cooperation in Development of the French Gaseous Diffusion Efforts'

In this memorandum, Wells reported on comments that West German Minister for Scientific Research Hans Lenz made during a meeting at the Atomic Energy Convention. Noting that West Germany had been holding talks with the French and EURATOM about building a reprocessing plant at Karlsruhe, Lenz “implied that this proposal quite likely had resulted in reports that Germany might be undertaking a cooperative program with France in the development of their gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte.” Lenz then reaffirmed West Germany's commitment to the 1955 Brussels Treaty pledge, declaring that West Germany would not initiate action to develop military applications of atomic energy.

June 6, 1963

Thomas L. Hughes, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Secretary of State, Research Memorandum, 'Franco-German Military Nuclear Cooperation,' REU-43

In this report, INR noted that the French had walked back statements by Charles de Gaulle in January 1963 that he would not object to the development of a West German nuclear capability. This report also includes notes on why the French opposed an MLF, claiming Washington might be "whetting the German appetite" for a national nuclear capability.

May 30, 1963

Memorandum from President Kennedy to Holders of NSAM 241

In this memorandum, President Kennedy questioned whether Washington should make “representations” to the Germans or Italians because that could have an adverse impact on U.S. relations with those countries in regards to attitudes towards Pierrelatte. He also expresses opposition to European nuclear cooperation overall.

May 30, 1963

Memorandum of Conversation between Georgi M. Kornienko, Chargé d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy, and Ronald I. Spiers, 'MLF, Disarmament'

In this conversation, Soviet diplomat Georgi Kornienko and State Department official Ronald Spiers discussed the Soviet objections to MLF. Kornienko argued that it would expose West Germany to “the nuclear disease” on the "road to disaster", but Spiers maintained that it would forestall the Germans from pursuing new nuclear programs.

Pagination