Search | Wilson Center Digital Archive

Switch to Visualization

English Great Britain United States Clear All

Related Resources

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

Western Europe

Great Britain

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

Western Europe

France

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Nuclear Proliferation

"The Bundeshaus (Federal Building) in Bonn, West Germany, May 1961. "

Western Europe

West Germany

French Nuclear History

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

A photo of Henry Kissinger from 1975

Kissinger, Henry

1923-

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

United States. Department of State

-

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

United States. Executive Office of the President

-

Pakistani Nuclear History

Berlin Wall between Mitte and Kreuzberg

Berlin Wall

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Sonnenfeldt, Helmut

1926-

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

United States. Embassy (Great Britain)

-

Truman with Attlee and Stalin at Potsdam

Cold War Origins

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

National Security Council (U.S.)

-

Indian Nuclear History

Results:

61 - 70 of 75

Display:

Sort By:

Documents

May 3, 1972	Memorandum from Holsey G. Handyside, 'Status Report on Proposed Nuclear Safety Talks with the French' Holsey G. Handyside reports on a meeting with Christopher J. Makins, First Secretary of the British Embassy. Handyside informs Makins that organizational meetings for the US-French nuclear safety talks were planned for May 4-5. The talks will not include any Restricted Data that the French do not already have. Handyside reiterates that the French are not aware that the British have been informed of the exchange. He also asked Makins for his opinion on why the British government has repeated asked for status updates about the talks.
June 16, 1972	Cable from Holsey G. Handyside to Ronald I. Spiers, 'Guidance on Nuclear Weapons Safety Talks with French' Handyside sends guidance for discussions with British diplomat Clive Rose on US nuclear assistance to France. The cable outlines points of discussion and emphasizes the secret nature of these talks as "we do not plan to inform French of fact that we are keeping UK generally informed."
December 1970	Report of the National Security Council Staff, 'NSSM 100 – Military Cooperation with France (Analytical Summary)' A summary and critical commentary on National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 100, an issue paper on potential US military aid to France's ballistic missile program. The report describes the specific French requests for assistance, current US policy restricting such assistance, and outlines options for future cooperation. The options are subdivided into three "approaches" based on the actors involved: 1) Bilateral US-French approaches, 2) NATO-oriented approaches, 3) Anglo-French or European-oriented approaches.
August 9, 1973	Memorandum of Conversation, 'French Nuclear Discussion' Transcript of conversation between Kissinger and Schlesinger. Kissinger wants to make Galley "drool" by keeping him interested without actually giving anything up. Kissinger worries about what the British want in terms of Polaris and notes that putting the French on the same footing as the U.S. would scare the British enough to get their point across.
November 2, 1978	'Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy London cable 18055 to State Department Comments by Robert Alston of the British Foreign Office on the State Department's "non-paper" on Pakistan. He questions the list of countries and expresses concern about the response of states with their own covert nuclear programs, like South Korea and Taiwan.
November 4, 1978	'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' Department of State cable 281962 to US Embassy United Kingdom et al. U.S. demarche and "non-paper" on Pakistan's attempts to complete the plutonium reprocessing plant and develop nuclear weapons. Sent to 12 countries to ensure that they "exercise vigilance and appropriate control to deter Pakistan from acquiring sensitive facilities."
November 6, 1978	'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy United Kingdom cable 18209 to State Department United Kingdom response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development. U.K. and U.S. Embassies will be cooperating in delivering information to Spain and Belgium.
November 1, 1978	'UK Approach to Supplier Governments on Pakistan,' State Department cable 278247 to US Embassy Bonn et al. Summary of a British report on problems with the export "trigger list" of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The list did not include gray area items that could be used in building nuclear facilities. To begin correcting the problem, the British announced a ban of inverter exports and asked other governments to take parallel steps. Also includes a summary of a secret British paper on Pakistan nuclear intentions. The British believed that the “piecemeal” Pakistani purchasing efforts to acquire inverters were directly related to the building of a gas centrifuge unit for producing weapons-grade uranium. Attached to the cable is a 7 November "Memorandum for the Record" discussing sharing this information with the Department of Energy.
November 13, 1978	'US Demarche on Pakistan Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy Spain Cable 13257 to State Department British ambassador's meeting with Spanish Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs to discuss the UK demarche on inverter exports. Under Secretary agrees to cooperate and block all loopholes.
November 21, 1978	US Embassy Stockholm Cable 4662 to State Department, 'UK Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant' Cable from U.S. Embassy in Stockholm debating Swedish responsiveness to U.S. and British demarches on inverters and reprocessing technology. It was an open question whether the Swedes were putting inverters on their trigger list and the U.S. would stay in touch with their British colleagues.