Skip to content

Results:

91 - 100 of 132

Documents

September 13, 1949

Council of Scientific and Industrial Research Director Shanti Swaroop Bhatnagar to Bhabha

A letter from S.S. Bhatnagar to Dr. Bhabha via the Indian Embassy in Washington D.C. apprising him of a visit with to the Atomic Energy Commission as well as providing an update on the acquisition of needed minerals.

September 21, 1972

Memorandum of Conversation, 'Indian Nuclear Developments'

A meeting between British Foreign Office and State Department officials on the Indian nuclear problem occurred the same month that Indian Prime Minister Gandhi approved the “final preparations for a PNE.” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Christopher T. Van Hollen (the father of the future Maryland Congressman) and his colleagues followed the approach taken by the Special National Intelligence Estimate, which was close to that taken by the British Joint Intelligence Committee. According to country director David Schneider, the “odds were about even” that India would make a decision, but once it was made, India could test very quickly. There was “no firm intelligence” that a “go-ahead signal” to prepare for a test had been made. Schneider reviewed bilateral and multilateral steps, proposed in the NSSM 156 study, that the U.S. and others could take to try to discourage an Indian test and the range of reactions that would be available if India went ahead. A “weak” U.S. reaction, Schneider observed, would suggest that Washington would “acquiesce” if other countries followed India’s example.

April 22, 1972

State Department Cable 69551 to US Embassy United Kingdom, 'Indian Nuclear Intentions'

The Canadian embassy had asked the State Department for information on the intelligence reports from earlier in the year that an Indian nuclear test was “imminent.” The State Department denied the request, but informed the Canadians that the reports were so numerous and their “congruity, apparent reliability, and seeming credibility” so striking that it had become necessary to update official thinking about Indian intentions.

April 7, 1972

State Department cable 59655 to US Embassy United Kingdom, 'Indian Nuclear Intentions'

The British Government took the same view as the Canadians, seeing no evidence that the Indians had made a decision to do a nuclear test, although they had the “capability.”

March 23, 1957

Memorandum of Conversation between John Foster Dulles and Selwyn Lloyd, 'Atomic Energy Items: (1) French Request (2) Test Limitation'

US-UK discussion of French nuclear weapons potential and efforts that could be undertaken to hinder or advance the their program. The French request for technical assistance from these two governments was also covered.

April 15, 1969

Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to President Nixon, 'Guidance to State and Defense Department on Our Attitude Toward Military Cooperation with the French'

Kissinger informs Nixon of a discussion he had with British Defense Minister Denis Healey about French/U.S. military cooperation. Kissinger has told Healey that the French have not approached the U.S., and that any decision to aid France would have to be heavily weighed beforehand. Kissinger and Healey have agreed to inform one another should he be approached for such assistance by France in the future.

April 22, 1969

Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to William P. Rogers, US-French Military Relations

This is a follow up of a memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon that was sent on April 15, 1969, where Nixon approved Kissinger to tell the Secretary of State the same points that were discussed in the original memorandum. Such points were that Kissinger has told Healey, British Defense Minister, that the French have not approached the U.S. for military assistance, and that any decision to aid France would have to be heavily weighed beforehand. The necessity for secrecy on these topics is stressed by Kissinger.

October 21, 1969

Memorandum from Theodore L. Eliot Jr. to Henry A. Kissinger, 'British Position on Nuclear Cooperation with France'

The British have not made any military or nuclear alliance with France, and they will disclose any such approaches from France to the United States. The U.S. is willing to say in response that they have not been approached by the French and would be willing to disclose any such approach in the future, but the U.S. is not willing say that their position is exactly the same as the British one because they "are not sure of the detailed implications of the broad phraseology of [the British’s] statement" and do not want to be bound to any extreme commitments.

December 5, 1979

Exchange of notes, Defense Minister Scholten (also to other NATO Defense ministers) – British Defense Secretary for Defense

Defense Minister Scholten writes to other NATO Defense Ministers to clarify the position of the Netherlands on TNF modernization. He focuses on issues related to the size of the modernization program, which in its current state he fears is too large, and also the possibility of separating the issues of making a decision on modernization and then implementing it. The British Defense Secretary then writes to refute each of his concerns on the wider issue of TNF modernization. An addendum focuses more specifically on the issues relating to the Netherlands.

1986

Peace Through Non-Alignment: The case for British withdrawal from NATO

Pamphlet arguing for British withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It examines the origins of NATO, its role in U.S. foreign policy, its nuclear strategies, and its effect on British politics and national security.

Pagination