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Documents

June 9, 1981

Memorandum for Richard V. Allen from Douglas J. Feith, ‘Israeli Raid on Iraqi Nuclear Facility’

NSC staffer Douglas J. Feith took the internal debate on the legitimacy of the raid a step further, stating that “no rebuke of Israel’s raid against Iraq should be issued without an equally emphatic rebuke of Iraq.” Feith’s argument was based on the fact that Iraq had continuously refused to acknowledge Israel’s existence and was officially at war with it.

June 9, 1981

Memorandum for Richard V. Allen from Raymond Tanter, 'Israel's Air Strike on Iraq's Nuclear Facility'

The NSC’s Raymond Tanter recommended a “middle course of action,” one which would distance Washington from the strike “while avoiding extreme measures designed to punish Israel.”

June 15, 1981

Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Walter J. Stoessel, ‘Political Strategy for Responding to Israeli Attack’

Following Lewis’ cable, and the realization that the raid should have been at least somewhat anticipated, the administration opted to develop a more restrained, sober approach towards Israel, constructing what was termed a “political strategy for responding to Israeli attack”.

June 9, 1981

Cable, American Embassy Tel Aviv to the Secretary of State, ‘Israeli Strike on Iraqi Nuclear Facility: Background for the Decision’

While starting to construct the political strategy of response to the raid, the administration came face to face with what U.S. ambassador to Israel, Sam Lewis called in his cable to Washington a “gap” in the administration’s “institutional memory”, as assessments regarding Israel’s intention to launch a strike were not passed on from the Carter administration.

June 11, 1981

Cable from Indian Embassy Baghdad to Foreign Ministry in Delhi

Indian diplomats speculated at the time that the suspension of the delivery of the F-16 jets was potentially a U.S. gesture of goodwill toward Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, aimed at appeasing him and keeping the embryonic peace process with Israel alive.

June 15, 1981

Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Richard V. Allen, ‘Political Strategy for Responding to Israeli Attack’

National Security Advisor Richard V. Allen informed Reagan that the administration was “not required to make a legal determination on whether Israel violated U.S. law” and commented that the issue of the raid was “to be treated as a political rather than a legal question.”

June 11, 1981

Memorandum for Richard V. Allen from Robert M Kimmitt, Subject: Israeli Strike -- Legal Aspects

This NSC memo examines some of the legal aspects of the raid. It states that the administration should determine “[W]hether a substantial violation has occurred”, as this would reflect on the delivery of Israel’s F-16 jets.

June 7, 1981

Memorandum for Mr. Richard V. Allen from L. Paul Bremer, III, ‘NSC Discussion Paper: Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Cooperation’

On 7 June 1981, the day of the Osirak raid, a policy paper composed by the ‘Senior Interagency Group on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Cooperation’ (SIG) was submitted to the NSC. The discussion paper crowned the administration’s nonproliferation efforts as a “key foreign policy objective” and called to revise the 1978 NNPA.

July 27, 1970

Message from Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to President Nixon (Transmitted by Col. Kennedy to Kissinger) regarding Soviet military presence in UAR.

A message from Ambassador Dobrynin to President Nixon regarding the Soviet military presence in the Middle East.

April 25, 1970

Memorandum of Conversation between Yitzak Rabin and Henry Kissinger

Rabin and. Kissinger discuss the Soviet's participation in the Egyptian Air Force, an increase in Egyptian air attacks on Israel, and potential American responses.

Pagination