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Documents

January 27, 1976

George Vest to the Secretary, 'Nuclear Suppliers Status Report'

In this document regarding the final agreement, George Vest wrote Kissinger that it “served to close many of the loopholes and inadequacies of previous nuclear cooperation agreements between suppliers and recipients.” It also put the French and West Germans on record to restrict access to sensitive nuclear technologies. Nevertheless, as Vest noted, the guidelines would not prevent “indigenous” development of nuclear capabilities and “unsafeguarded developments” or the acquisition of sensitive technology.

December 31, 1975

Memorandum from George S. Springsteen, Executive Secretary, to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, 'Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines'

This document comprises the instructions which the White House approved for the September 1975 suppliers’ meeting. At the November meeting, the suppliers completed negotiations on guidelines. Basic provisions included agreement to seek assurances by recipients of supplies not to produce nuclear explosive devices, physical security for installations and materials, transfer of trigger list items only under IAEA safeguards, restraint in transfer of sensitive technologies, facilities and materials, and the encouragement of supplier involvement in, and multinational controls over, sensitive installations. Appended to the guidelines was a two page “trigger list” based on the Zangger Committee’s list.

June 23, 1992

Letter from US President G. H. W. Bush to Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk

Bush addresses Ukraine’s security concerns following its commitment on May 24 in Lisbon to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear state.

October 15, 1975

Memorandum of Conversation, 'Visit of Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger to Canada; Luncheon at 24 Sussex Drive'

This memo contains a transcription of the conversation that took place when Secretary Kissinger and his wife visited Canada and had lunch with Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau, along with many other officials.

October 15, 1975

Briefing Paper, 'Nuclear Suppliers Conference,' Secretary's Trip to Ottawa

This document describes Canada's position on safeguards as well as the United State's position and how the U.S. will respond to Canada. The Canadians strongly supported the former, “full scope safeguards," and although Washington had included the substance of full-scope safeguards in the original five-point paper but Kissinger would not go against the French and risk the hard-won understanding that had brought them into the group.

October 10, 1975

George Vest to Mr. Sonnenfeldt, 'British Comprehensive Safeguards Initiative re Suppliers Conference'

This document describes the differing views regarding safeguards. The Canadians strongly supported the former, “full scope safeguards” (their terminology, which caught on), which the French saw as “tantamount to imposing NPT obligations”--a reference to the Treaty’s Article III--which they would not accept. Arguing that full-scope safeguards was “alien to [their] philosophy,” the French suggested that a “traditional interpretation of the contamination principle (i.e., requiring safeguards on any materials produced in exported facilities),” would make it possible to achieve “the practical equivalent” of the Canadian proposal.

September 15, 1975

U.S. Embassy London telegram 14177 to State Department, 'French-U.S. Consultations on Nuclear Suppliers Meeting'

Telegram illuminates the U.S. –French dialogue over safeguards and other provisions in the nuclear suppliers’ guidance. Arguing that full-scope safeguards was “alien to [their] philosophy,” the French suggested that a “traditional interpretation of the contamination principle (i.e., requiring safeguards on any materials produced in exported facilities),” would make it possible to achieve “the practical equivalent” of the Canadian proposal.

September 23, 1975

Memorandum from George S. Vest to Secretary of State, 'September 16-17 Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting'

The September 1975 meeting of the suppliers’ group brought out a conflict over a decisive issue, whether supplying countries should require recipient countries to place all nuclear facilities under safeguards or require them only for the technology and supplies at issue in the contract (“project safeguards”). The Canadians strongly supported the former, “full scope safeguards” (their terminology, which caught on), which the French saw as “tantamount to imposing NPT obligations” --a reference to the Treaty’s Article III--which they would not accept.

June 1975

Briefing Paper prepared for the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, 'Status Summary of Nuclear Suppliers Conference and Relevant Bilateral Discussion'

This document summarizes the nuclear suppliers' meeting on June 18-19. Topics covered included whether safeguards should apply to the entire nuclear fuel cycle (later known as “full-scope” safeguards). Another issue was whether multinational auspices for reprocessing and enrichment plants should be mandatory or a matter of discretion by a supplier country. On these matters and others, the French position was central.

June 19, 1975

U.S. Embassy London telegram 9376 to State Department, 'Nuclear Export Policy: Bilaterals with FRG'

The U.S. delegation agreed to develop a policy paper that would take into account French and other views so as to reach agreement on the most “stringent” safeguards possible. A central but divisive issue was whether safeguards should apply to the entire nuclear fuel cycle (later known as “full-scope” safeguards). Another issue was whether multinational auspices for reprocessing and enrichment plants should be mandatory or a matter of discretion by a supplier country.

Pagination