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Nuclear Proliferation

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

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South Asia

Pakistan

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Western Europe

France

Pakistani Nuclear History

"The Bundeshaus (Federal Building) in Bonn, West Germany, May 1961. "

Western Europe

West Germany

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

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United States. Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research

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The Taj Mahal Shrine in Agra, India.

South Asia

India

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Hughes, Thomas Lowe

1925-

Indian Nuclear History

A photo of Henry Kissinger from 1975

Kissinger, Henry

1923-

Aerial photograph of CIA headquarters

United States. Central Intelligence Agency

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United States. Department of State

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South African Nuclear History

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Iklé, Fred Charles

-

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Chinese Nuclear History

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January 31, 1962	Research Memorandum REU-25 from Roger Hilsman to Mr. Kohler, 'European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability' Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”
January 4, 1960	Department of State Burea of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Information Brief No. 236, 'Yugoslavia Nuclear Reactor Goes into Operation' This report gives an overview of Yugoslavia’s nuclear program and its tight links with both East and West in terms of financial aid and training programs
May 13, 1959	Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Information Brief No. 139, 'Disarmament Negotiations: The Fourth Power Problem: France' According to intelligence reports, the French were trying to acquire from US firms the diagnostic technology needed to measure a nuclear explosion. INR did not believe that France had identified a specific test site and noted that France was under pressure to hold a test somewhere other than North Africa; nevertheless it went ahead with one in Algeria in early 1960.
June 4, 1957	Department of State Office of Intelligence Research, 'OIR Contribution to NIE 100-6-57: Nuclear Weapons Production by Fourth Countries – Likelihood and Consequences' This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57. Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the “Fourth Country” problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957, Secret
July 27, 1982	National Intelligence Estimate NIE 4-82, 'Nuclear Proliferation Trends Through 1987' This estimate seeks to analyze the actions of a series of countries, which in the course of 1982-1987 could affect U.S. interests. It analyzes countries with developing nuclear programs in different regions in the world (South Asia, East Asia, Near East, Latin America, and Africa) and their intentions and capabilities in terms of nuclear weapons.
December 18, 1975	Memorandum to Holders of Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 4-1-74: Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons This estimate updates the 1974 predictions, and analyzes the “earliest dates of the technical feasibility of possession of a nuclear device” of the Republic of China, Pakistan, South Africa, The Republic of Korea, Argentina and Brazil, among others.
February 7, 1967	Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Euratom Commission Draft proposed by the US Government to the USSR. Contains six articles detailing the obligations and responsibilities of nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states.
September 23, 1977	State Department telegram 229507 to U.S. Embassy London et al., 'Nuclear Suppliers Meeting – Assessment' This document describes the progress made up to that point and the various concerns of countries within the group regarding the scale of safeguards, particularly from the French and Germans. The NSG also agreed to make the guidelines available to the IAEA so that it could publish them. The State Department had been reluctant to publish them, not least because they did not include full scope safeguards, but overriding that was an interest in dispelling Third World concerns about a “secret cartel.”
September 15, 1977	State Department telegram 222114 to U.S. Embassy Paris, 'Nuclear Suppliers Meeting' This document reflects that while full-scope safeguards had wide support in the group, both the French and the West German remained opposed. The Carter administration tried to persuade the French but they were worried about being "isolated" in the group and talked about withdrawing or opposing further meetings because the NSG had “fully achieved” its objectives. Washington persuaded Paris not to withdraw, but the group’s future was plainly uncertain.
May 3, 1977	State Department telegram to U.S. Embassy London et al., 'Nuclear Suppliers Meeting, April 28-29, 1977' This document describes the meeting of 15 nuclear supplier states in London where issues were discussed such as full-scope safeguards, including sanctions in the guidelines, purpose of supplier consent, moratoriums, enlargement of membership, and various countries' individual concerns were voiced and addressed.