Analysis of the recent Chinese nuclear weapon test and it's strategic implications for China's diplomatic and military policies.

K.R. Narayanan, Director of China Division at Ministry of External Affairs, writes that the explosion of the first nuclear bomb by China will alter the political balance of Asia and the world and development of nuclear weapons by India can be justified and beneficial for the country and the international system as well.

Homi Bhabha writes to Prime Minister Nehru about India's international status as a country possessing a plutonium plant but not a nuclear weapons program.

Homi Bhabha writes to Prime Minister Nehru to convey that the Chinese nuclear test will be of no military significance and Chinese possession of a few bombs will not make any difference to the military situation. In order to counter the Chinese bomb’s psychological-political impact, Dr. Bhabha argues that India needs to be in a position to produce the bomb within few months.

The Indian Ministry of Defense evaluated the impact of the Chinese nuclear explosion and reported that the more immediate and real Chinese threat comes from conventional arms. The Chinese nuclear test poses a long term military threat, but its strategic implication and India's consequent actions require constant review.

The note contains articles on the peaceful utilization of atomic energy and other achievements in nuclear science by China, which were shown to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai by Prime Minister Nehru.

The letter contains a copy of articles on the peaceful utilization of atomic energy and research work in the nuclear science in China, which could help Indian experts to understand China’s capabilities in the nuclear science.

The Government of China announces its successful nuclear test but states that it will follow a no first use policy and in fact desires for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

A prospective Chinese MRBM force led INR to consider whether Beijing would believe that it had more freedom of action to step up its involvement in the Vietnam War: it “might feel freer in extending aid to Hanoi and becoming more involved in the war if US pressure on the North Vietnamese seemed to require it.”

Years before Beijing actually deployed an ICBM in 1981, US intelligence estimated the possibility of the deployment of a “few operable, though probably relatively inefficient missiles” as early as 1971.