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Israeli Nuclear History

Photograph of the Port of Jaffa in Israel.

Middle East

Israel

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South America

Argentina

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Harman, Avraham

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Ben-Gurion, David

1886- 1973

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United States. Department of State

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Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald)

1917- 1963

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Rusk, Dean

1909- 1994

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Jones, G. Lewis

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Western Europe

France

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Central Africa

Gabon

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Southern Africa

South Africa

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Indian Nuclear History

South African Nuclear History

Nuclear Proliferation

Pakistani Nuclear History

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July 15, 1964	Airgram CA-528 from the Department of State to US Embassies in Israel and Argentina, 'Israeli Purchase of Argentine Uranium' This joint State Department and CIA message reported an unconfirmed intelligence of an Argentine-Israeli agreement on 3 November 1963, and requested information on the specifics of the deal by 1 September 1964.
July 6, 1964	Letter from Arthur R. H. Kellas, British Embassy in Tel Aviv, to Alan C. Goodison, Eastern Department of the Foreign Office In response to Alan Goodison's April 29 letter, which referred to evidence for an Israeli plutonium separation facility, Arthur Kellas, counselor to the British Embassy in Tel Aviv, states that the British Embassy had “not seen such evidence [for a separation facility] and should be grateful to know what it is."
July 1, 1964	Letter from D. Arkell, Defense Intelligence Staff, to R. J. T. McLaren, Eastern Department of the Foreign Office According to D. Arkell of the Defence Intelligence Staff, Canadian intelligence was now doubtful about the reliability of their reports on the Argentine-Israeli uranium sale.
June 22, 1964	Letter from Alan C. Goodison, Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, to C. J. Audland, British Embassy in Buenos Aires Noting some inaccuracy in the Canadian Defence Research Board report---Argentina could not have offered to sell its “entire production” of uranium if it was also selling concentrate to Germany and trying to sell it to Japan—Goodison, of the Foreign Office's Eastern Department, asked Audland, a political officer at the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, to “keep your ears to the ground” to find the “exact quantities” involved.
June 4, 1964	Letter from Christopher Audland, British Embassy in Buenos Aires, to Alan Goodison, Eastern Department of the Foreign Office Christopher Audland, a political officer at the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, learned from the Canadian Charge d'Affaires that the information on the Argentine-Israel uranium deal "did not originate in Buenos Aires," and that the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission had made previous uranium sales to West Germany and to Israel in 1962. Minutes are attached.
April 29, 1964	Letter from Alan C. Goodison, Eastern Department of the Foreign Office to Arthur R. H. Kellas, British Embassy In a letter to Arthur Kellas, counselor at the British Embassy in Tel Aviv, Alan Goodison of the Foreign Office's Eastern Department disclosed the Argentine-Israel uranium deal, which involved the transfer of 80-100 tons over 33 months. Since evidence suggested that Israel had facilities for plutonium separation, they estimated that there would be enough plutonium for a weapon within 20 months; however, Goodison had no proof that the Israelis planned to produce a nuclear weapon, only that they had the capability to do so. Minutes are attached.
June 11, 1964	Letter from Peter Ramsbotham, British Embassy in Paris, to William 'Willie' Morris, Foreign Office This letter describes a meeting between Peter Ramsbotham, chief of the chancery at the British Embassy in France, and George Soutou, a senior official at the French Foreign Ministry. Soutou acknowledged that the French believed that the Israelis were attempting to "put themselves in a position to make a nuclear bomb if they wanted to." The French-Israeli agreement did not include a condition that prevented the use of non-French uranium for Dimona, and Ramsbotham wondered whether the French should be told about the Argentine-Israeli secret deal. Minutes of a conversation with Arkell of the Defense Intelligence Staff are attached.
October 8, 1964	Report, Canadian Defence Research Board, 'Possible Israeli Military Nuclear Program' After analyzing photographs taken of the Israeli nuclear facility at Dimona, J. Koop, a career intelligence analyst at Canada's Defence Research Board, concluded in March 1964 that Dimona had all of the "prerequisites for commencing a modest nuclear weapons development project." When the Dimona reactor went critical, it could produce enough plutonium for at least one implosion device by the end of 1965 and increase its operating level to produce one to two per year by 1966. Arthur Kellas, a British diplomat in Israel, wrote in his forwarding letter that they were highly impressed by the analysis.
June 11, 1964	Cable from the US Embassy in France to the Department of State, 'Franco-Israeli Nuclear Relations' Peter Ramsbotham, chief of the chancery at the British Embassy in France, passed along information to the US Embassy about his meeting with George Soutou, a senior official at the French Foreign Ministry. While the French by then did not want Israel to acquire nuclear weapons, they believed that the Israelis were seeking them.
March 26, 1964	Cable from the US Embassy in France to the Department of State According Jacques Martin, a French Foreign Ministry expert, the Israelis were demanding to know why the French were holding up uranium shipments. The French replied that until Israel was ready to purchase only from France, allowing France “some control over the situation” [in Dimona], the restrictions would continue.