1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
Western Europe
North America
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1923-
1926-
October 26, 1990
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 26 October 1990 describes the latest developments in Iran, Kuwait, the Soviet Union, Lebanon, Pakistan, New Zealand and Gulf States.
January 14, 1989
The CIA's National Intelligence Daily for 14 January 1989 covers developments in Afghanistan, France, Cuba, Lebanon, Syria, the Soviet Union, and China. Certain portions of the document are redacted due to b(1) and b(3) exemptions.
May 22, 1964
Noting that the situation that gave rise to NSAM 41 had improved, Read informed Bundy that intelligence reporting would continue but he wanted permission to stop work responsive to the NSAM. There had been “no indication of any attempts by the French to enlist German or Italian cooperation in the Pierrrelatte project.”
July 5, 1963
In this memorandum, Secretary of State Rusk noted Minister Lenz’s denials of any German connection with Pierrelatte or any interest in supporting the French weapons program. He declared that the agencies would continue “reviewing allied attitudes toward the Pierrelatte project and possible measures for inhibiting bilateral cooperation.”
May 29, 1963
In this document, Assistant Secretary to European Affairs, William Tyler, discussed the State Department's request to the US Embassy to ask the West German government whether there was an arrangement in the French-German Friendship Treaty that included a secret annex on military and nuclear cooperation.
May 25, 1963
In this memorandum, Under Secretary Ball recommended making a greater effort to find more information about German or Italian interest in financial and other kinds of support for the Pierrelatte plant. Ball also suggested that Washington minimize German interest in acquiring nuclear fuel from non-US sources by making “assurances of a long-term supply of cheap nuclear fuel for peaceful uses."
May 21, 1963
This AEC report looked at the Pierrelatte plant’s prospective capabilities, possible West German motives for seeking an independent supply of enriched uranium (possibly in cooperation with the French), the “adverse” implications of a French-German project, and policy alternatives available to Washington. If the West Germans were determined to contribute to the French enrichment project, the AEC saw serious risks including the “the prospects of a Franco-German military alliance that could constitute a European third force capable of dominating Western Europe."
May 13, 1963
In this report, the CIA and the AEC found that because the French underestimated the cost of the Pierrelatte plant, they had a reason to consider West German financial aid.They conclude that the West Germans had relevant technical skill and the French may have regarded cooperation as a tactic to dodge Adenauer’s 1954 commitment and also as a “way for German industry to improve its position in the nuclear technological race.”
January 23, 1963
In a follow up report to an airgram from December 28, 1962, the U.S. embassy in Bonn determined that the French and the Germans were considering building a reprocessing plant at the Karlsruhe nuclear complex.
December 28, 1962
This report from the American embassy in Bon to the Department of State details the embassy's impressions that cooperation between France and Germany in the atomic energy field was underway.