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Documents

January 31, 1962

Research Memorandum REU-25 from Roger Hilsman to Mr. Kohler, 'European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability'

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

May 13, 1959

Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Information Brief No. 139, 'Disarmament Negotiations: The Fourth Power Problem: France'

According to intelligence reports, the French were trying to acquire from US firms the diagnostic technology needed to measure a nuclear explosion. INR did not believe that France had identified a specific test site and noted that France was under pressure to hold a test somewhere other than North Africa; nevertheless it went ahead with one in Algeria in early 1960.

June 4, 1957

Department of State Office of Intelligence Research, 'OIR Contribution to NIE 100-6-57: Nuclear Weapons Production by Fourth Countries – Likelihood and Consequences'

This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57. Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the “Fourth Country” problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957, Secret

July 2, 1975

Letter, L. N. Ray, High Commissioner of India, Wellington, 'French Nuclear Test'

France conducted a nuclear test on the South Pacific atoll which New Zealand criticized.

April 7, 1956

Report No. 79 from Young Kee Kim to Syngman Rhee

Young Kee Kim briefs Syngman Rhee about the anti-American sentiment arising in the Filipino Congress and Korea's admission to SEATO.

February 22, 1972

Memorandum of Conversation between Richard Nixon and Zhou Enlai

June 15, 1956

Report of a Conversation with Mr. Nguyen Huu Chau

Choi Duk Shin outlines his discussion with Secretary of State to the President, Nguyen Huu Chau the possibility of a South Korea-South Vietnam-Tiawan triple alliance.

July 13, 1956

CDS Report No. 9 from Choi Duk Shin to the President (Syngman Rhee)

Choi Duk Shin reports on Vice President Nixon's visit and his statements in Karachi concerning communism in East Asia, discusses the "Cao Dai" religion in relation to communism, and briefly mentions his visit with French Ambassador Hoppenot.

September 23, 1977

State Department telegram 229507 to U.S. Embassy London et al., 'Nuclear Suppliers Meeting – Assessment'

This document describes the progress made up to that point and the various concerns of countries within the group regarding the scale of safeguards, particularly from the French and Germans. The NSG also agreed to make the guidelines available to the IAEA so that it could publish them. The State Department had been reluctant to publish them, not least because they did not include full scope safeguards, but overriding that was an interest in dispelling Third World concerns about a “secret cartel.”

September 15, 1977

State Department telegram 222114 to U.S. Embassy Paris, 'Nuclear Suppliers Meeting'

This document reflects that while full-scope safeguards had wide support in the group, both the French and the West German remained opposed. The Carter administration tried to persuade the French but they were worried about being "isolated" in the group and talked about withdrawing or opposing further meetings because the NSG had “fully achieved” its objectives. Washington persuaded Paris not to withdraw, but the group’s future was plainly uncertain.

Pagination