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March 7, 1972

US Embassy Canada cable 391 to State Department, 'India’s Nuclear Intentions'

U.S. embassy officials report on an interview with Lauren Gray, the chairman of Canada’s Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), who had recently visited India. Having spoken with Homi Nusserwanji Sethna, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and other officials, Gray believed that Sethna opposed a test and that as long as Sethna and Indira Gandhi were in office “there was no chance” that India would test a nuclear device, which would take three to four years to prepare. Other officials with the AECB disagreed with Gray's estimates - based on their assessment of Indian’s ability to produce weapons grade plutonium, they argued that it would take no more than a year to produce a device. They also pointed out that about 18 months earlier there had been a “blackout” of statistical information on plutonium production in India.

February 23, 1972

Memorandum from Ray Cline, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, enclosing 'Possibility of an Indian Nuclear Test'

At the request of Undersecretary of State John Irwin, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) prepared an assessment which included a detailed review of Indian’s nuclear facilities and their capacity to produce weapons-grade plutonium as well as capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons to a target. While India had signed agreements with Canada and the United States that nuclear reactors were to be used for peaceful purposes, the Indians were likely to claim that an explosive device for “peaceful” purposes was consistent with the agreements. Whether the Indians were going to test in the near future was in doubt. INR could not “rule out” one in the near future. Further, the “strongest incentive [to test] may well be the desire for the increased status of a nuclear power.” All the same, “it our judgment that a decision to authorize a test is unlikely in the next few months and may well be deferred for several years.” Weighing against a test were the financial and diplomatic costs, for example, “India's full awareness that assistance from the US and other countries (possibly including the USSR) would be jeopardized.”

November 4, 1978

'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' Department of State cable 281962 to US Embassy United Kingdom et al.

U.S. demarche and "non-paper" on Pakistan's attempts to complete the plutonium reprocessing plant and develop nuclear weapons. Sent to 12 countries to ensure that they "exercise vigilance and appropriate control to deter Pakistan from acquiring sensitive facilities."

November 7, 1978

'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy Canada cable 5446 to State Department

Canadian response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully and expressing surprise that Pakistan was attempting to complete the reprocessing plant.

January 25, 1988

Intelligence Note from West Germany’s National Olympic Committee to the International Olympic Committee on the possibility of North Korean terrorist threats to the 1988 Seoul Olympics

A letter from Willi Daume, a member of West Germany's Olympic Committee, discussing intelligence that suggested North Korea would attempt to disrupt the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul.

February 16, 1988

Letter from the International Olympic Committee President to Fidel Castro regarding North Korea’s Participation in the 1988 Olympics

Letter from the International Olympic Committee President to Castro in response to Cuba's decision not to attend the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

Pagination