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Documents

July 30, 1971

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

The ROK government is anxious about the Nixon-Zhou Enlai meeting.Their anxiety stems from the US military disengagement in the ROK, Zhou's four-point program, and the potential for communist China to sway UN votes on the Korean question.

February 26, 1971

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

Internationally, ROK government voices concern about the UN's two-China policy. Domestically, the NDP accuses the government of suppressing the opposition party's election campaign.

January 20, 1983

Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 13/32-83, 'Chinese Policy and Practices Regarding Sensitive Nuclear Transfers'

With nuclear proliferation a policy priority for the Jimmy Carter administration, and Pakistan already a special concern, the possibility that China and Pakistan were sharing nuclear weapons-related information began was beginning to worry US government officials. These concerns did not go away during the Reagan administration. While nuclear proliferation was not a top priority, the administration was apprehensive about the implications of the spread of nuclear capabilities and that China may have been aiding and abetting some potential proliferators by selling unsafeguarded nuclear materials.

December 7, 1979

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment, Central Intelligence Agency, Enclosing Report, 'A Review of the Evidence of Chinese Involvement in Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program'

With nuclear proliferation a policy priority for the Jimmy Carter administration, and Pakistan already a special concern, the possibility that China and Pakistan were sharing nuclear weapons-related information began was beginning to worry US government officials. They had no hard evidence--and the soft evidence that concerned them is massively excised in the December 1979 report just as Beijing and Washington were normalizing relations—so the “precise nature and extent of this cooperation is uncertain.”

February 26, 1989

Memorandum of Conversation: President Bush's Meeting with Chairman Deng Xiaoping of the People's Republic of China, February 26, 1989, 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

Conversation between Deng Xiaoping and President George Bush on Sino-US relations. Deng expressed the hope that the bilateral relationship would develop in a "new pattern" based on mutual trust, mutual support, and minimizing as much as possible mutual problems. They also discussed the continued tensions between China and the Soviet Union,

June 17, 1982

Terry Jones, Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy, Dept of State, to J. Devine et al., enclosing summaries of State Dept cable traffic during 1981-1982 relating to demarches on attempted purchase of sensitive nuclear-related products

A summary of U.S. State Department cable traffic regarding Pakistan’s nuclear efforts in 1981-1982. While the Reagan administration was inclined to give Pakistan some leeway in light of their support for anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the acquisition of sensitive nuclear technology from abroad was still something that the administration was against. Evidence that Pakistan had made efforts, some successful, to acquire specific technology that suggested a nuclear test was being prepared raised a red flag in the U.S. government

December 3, 1973

Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger from Richard H. Solomon, “The Korean Situation and the China Element"

National Security Council staff member Richard H. Solomon advises Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to work with the Chinese in order to respond to North Korea's provocations along the Northern Limit Line

Pagination