Kohl and Rabin discuss the situation in the Near and Middle East and the changed in Syria's position toward Israel after the demise of the Soviet Union. Rabin expresses concern about the continued arms race in the region and Syria's purchases of Scud missiles from Russia and Slovakia. He also reiterates Iraq's continued capability to go nuclear within 5 to 6 years despite international arms control inspections. Last but not least, Kohl and Rabin discuss the situation in Iran and Kohl's contacts with President Rafsandjani.

Kohl and Faisal discuss the situation in the Gulf, Germany's foreign policy and its financial assistance as well as Saddam Hussein's position in the Arab world.

The document discusses the Soviet position on German unification in six separate parts. The first deals with confusion over Gorbachev's better than expected consent to unification. Second are the potential domestic and foreign policy reasons the USSR consented so readily to unification, followed by the third part which outlines potential Soviet benefits from the process. The fourth section discusses the autonomy of the new German government, which is backed up with the fifth section discussing public sentiment. The final portion discusses the fine line for both the Soviet Union and the West between being overbearing on Germany's new independence and not helping enough.

The document outlines other countries' reactions to the prospect of German Reunification. The fears of France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg are cataloged. In addition, Western allies such as the United States, United Kingdom, and France are marked as being hopeful for the upcoming reunion of the two states.

In light of Kohl & Gorbachev's joint statement (June 13, 1989), the Head of the Department for Western and Northern Europe of the Political Section of the Austrian Foreign Ministry discusses German reunification, the Berlin Question, and Detente. The report discusses the resistant attitudes of the West, with the exception of the US, towards German reunification.

In this extraordinary conversation, Solidarity’s leader fears the collapse of the Wall would distract West Germany’s attention - and money - to the GDR, at the time when Poland, the trail-blazer to the post-communist era in Eastern Europe, desperately needed both. "Events are moving too fast," Walesa said, and only hours later, the Wall fell, and Kohl had to cut his Poland visit short to scramble back to Berlin, thus proving Walesa’s fear correct.

Verbal message from Mikhail Gorbachev to François Mitterrand, Margaret Thatcher and George Bush regarding message sent to Chancellor Kohl appealing for measures to be taken to prevent destabilization of the situation

Information about the Content of a Telephone Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl regarding discussing the desire to see reforms in the GDR occur in a calm and non-chaotic manner

Verbal message from Mikhail Gorbachev to Helmut Kohl regarding the GDR’s decision to allow unrestricted travel to the FRG