Kohl and Rabin discuss the situation in the Near and Middle East and the changed in Syria's position toward Israel after the demise of the Soviet Union. Rabin expresses concern about the continued arms race in the region and Syria's purchases of Scud missiles from Russia and Slovakia. He also reiterates Iraq's continued capability to go nuclear within 5 to 6 years despite international arms control inspections. Last but not least, Kohl and Rabin discuss the situation in Iran and Kohl's contacts with President Rafsandjani.

A detailed analysis of Israel's founding and the history of East German foreign policy toward Israel and the Arab states. Vehemently attacking Israel, and emphasizing the close relations between West Germany and Israel, was considered essential to capture the interest of Arab audiences, steering them towards closer relations with the GDR.

Weiss and Nasser discuss the events of the 1967 Arab-Israeli or Six-Day War.

The two ambassadors discuss relations between East and West Germany, as well as Somalia President Siad Barre's trip to visit Arab states.

This record of a meeting with the secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Boris Ponomarev, and with the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Konstantin Katushev, addresses the anti-Soviet course adopted by Beijing. The discussion specifically refers to relations between China and the Communist parties of Albania, Romania, Australia, France, Italy, and New Zealand. The document also assesses the situation in Anwar el-Sadat's Egypt, in Hafez al-Assad's Syria, in Iraq, and in Yemen, the main idea being that the Socialist countries should support the development of progressive Arabic states.

Karmal describes threats against the Soviet-backed Afghan government from Pakistan, Iran, the US, China, and Egypt.

East German and North Korean officials discuss North Korea's economic and political relations with India, Indonesia, Burma, Syria, and Japan.

The document describes the negotiations between Soviet leaders and Nasser, which mainly focused on the conflict in the Middle East and the possible recognition of the GDR by the United Arab Republic. Nasser emphasized that there would be no direct talks between the UAR and Israel, but that the UAR would be willing to take part in a UN negotiated attempt to solve the conflict, upon the condition that Israel withdraw its troops from the occupied territories. Nasser was reluctant to follow the Soviet demand for a diplomatic recognition of the GDR.

Ulbricht writes to Brezhnev about the delegation to the UAR, led by Mr. Weiss. Ulbricht assesses the political situation in the UAR with respect to Nasser and the weak situation of the Arab Socialist Union. Ulbricht also informs Brezhnev about the situation in the SAR, which seems to be worsening due to a lack of concepts for postwar recovery. Ulbricht suggests sending economic and political experts in order to strengthen the cooperation between the UAR, the SAR and the socialist countries.

Ulbricht expresses his consent for the measures proposed by the Soviet leadership. He underlines the demand for an Israeli withdrawal and points out that otherwise it would be necessary to lead a war of attrition against the Israeli occupation forces. The participation of volunteers from the socialist countries would be necessary, but would require further consideration.