The document includes Hungarian Council of Ministers meeting minutes from 25 October 1962. The minutes are dominated by János Kádár’s detailed overview of events leading up to the current international situation. The overview is preceded by the Council of Ministers approving the government’s public statement on the Cuban Missille Crisis. During the session Kádár summarizes US provocation, Cuban and Soviet responses, and the military mobilization of different countries and military alliances, and Hungary’s political campaign in support of Cuba. Kádár notes negotiations between Cuba, the US, and Soviet Union initiate the day before. The minutes also include exchanges between Kádár and other Council of Ministers representatives.

Major Golovány writes to Hungarian Minister of Defense Lajos Zzineage and proposes the Hungarian military prepare for combat readiness in response to the President Kennedy’s increasing provocation towards Cuba.

In a top secret report, Hungarian Ambassador to Cuba János Beck describes a recent meeting with Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos. Beck divides the conversation among five categories—agriculture, industry, central planning, counter-revolutionary activities, and the party. Dorticos reports improvements and obstacles (e.g. agricultural production is developing, though slowly, and the growth of the party remains in its initial stages of formation).

Ambassador János Beck reports on diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and Cuba. Beck speculates that FRG does intelligence work for departed Americans. Central to Beck’s report is the fact that Cuba wants to preserve diplomatic relations with as many countries as possible. Relevant is the Hallstein principle and the presence of FRG diplomats and German Democratic Republic’s Political Commission. (There are two self-governing and independent German states in Cuba.)

Ambassador János Beck reports on Foreign Minister Péter Mód’s visit to Cuba, and with whom he met. The report is divided among four different official meetings: Foreign Minister Raul Roa, Prime Minister Fidel Castro, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI). Beck summarizes each meeting separately. Topics include Cuba’s expectation of a US invasion and the US’s current clandestine activities, Organization of American States (OAS) and its use as a political tool in US-Latin American relations, Sino-Soviet relations, socialist unity and the importance of Soviet trade, Cuba’s perceived Soviet military advantage over the US, and the Communist Party’s development/popularity in Cuba. Many of these topics appear in various meetings outlined in the report.

Chargé d’ affaires ad interim Miklós Vass reports on secret US State Department documents that Cuban Minister of Industry Ernesto “Che” Guevara acquired. The documents reveal US principles on Venezuelan economic policy and US positions on Latin American states and Latin American public opinion on Cuba. Vass advises that the secret documents be translated officially into Hungarian and sent to Hungarian embassies throughout Latin America. The document included three enclosures; Vass references two secret documents repeatedly.

During a conversation with the Hungarian party delegation, Kim Il Sung desribes the DPRK's domestic development as well as its foreign relations with Hungary and United States.

These notes discuss foreign policy issues related to China, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Romania. To quote the document itself, it "was a bilateral discussion of the internal situation of fraternal Parties and countries, and later an exchange of opinion on contemporary foreign policy questions and the problems of the international workers’ movement."

Discussion with the chair of the Atomic Energy Commission of India, Homi Sethna. The United States is no longer supplying India with nuclear fuel or supporting its nuclear energy program, creating an opportunity for cooperation between Hungary and India.

This document explains the views of the cooperating Socialist countries relating to Afghanistan. The USSR perceived the US attempt to line up NATO support against the Soviets as an aggressive action, designed to counter Soviet influence. The Soviets, by contrast, viewed their involvement in Afghanistan as increasing their sphere of influence around the Warsaw-pact countries, making such actions defense, rather than offensive. The USSR's leadership states that it should increase its ties to NATO countries to counteract the foreign policy of the US.