Italian perspective on the NATO Council of Ministers meeting in Brussels that discussed the credibility of Western European defense. The document highlights the need for a unified and cohesive negotiation strategy among the allies.

This rather technical document compares the strategic capabilities (conventional and nuclear) of Warsaw Pact and NATO. The document notes that Warsaw Pact has considerably increased its capabilities catching up with the West, and raises the question about Soviet intentions, and whether continuing armament is in line with peaceful coexistence.

Observations of the SMD on two topics, "The British vision of NATO weapons" and "General Norstad to the Atlantic Council." It concludes with three handwritten pages by Alessandrini to Andreotti, 3 February 1961.

Alessandrini writes regarding the Minister Of Foreign Affairs speech on the problems of NATO's military, including its nuclear strategy. Despite the assurances of the United States, Europeans fear of having to fight conventional Soviet forces.

This document is related to Brosi's discussion with Acherson on NATO nuclear weaponry and strategy. Brosio underlines how the American nuclear strategy is rejected by European countries. Most of them are skeptical and take distance from Americans' willingness to use nuclear weapon against their enemies. In this sense, Acherson as representative of the American government, is ready to discuss the topic at a multilateral level.

Summarizes the first comments from Min. Foreign Affairs on the agreement Soviet-American for the Prevention of Nuclear War. It is said that the philosophy of this agreement appears to have contradictions with regard to the classic strategy of NATO and diminish the credibility of the latter. Conceptions NATO military will have to be updated in light of recent agreements and ongoing trends around the Russian-American bipolarity. Just because you are at a "secondary" compared to the two supergrandi, Europeans should take the opportunity arising from this new trend to seriously address the issue of their defense. The prospect more desirable at this stage is an acceleration of proesso European unification, including the appearance of its "independent" defense.

A memo to Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi from his foreign policy advisor Antonio Badini about the domestic constraints on Dutch foreign policy.

A memo to Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi from his Diplomatic Counselor Antonio Badini. Badini warns against the latest Soviet proposals. He suggests that agreeing to them without making any concessions regarding the deployment of American missiles would be tantamount to the realization of a long term goal of the Soviet Union, i.e. the decoupling between the Western European and the American defense system. […] He writes that the Soviet proposals “can be taken as a possible basis for an agreement is surprising. We can
only hope that this fact does not imply that, from a political and psychological standpoint, the process of Finlandization of Europe is far more advanced than we believed thus far.”

This memo expresses the regrets of the Italian government for the failure of the INF negotiations. According to the memo, Italy “committed itself to the normalization of the East – West dialogue” and proposed resuming Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks.

An exhaustive memo on the deployment of the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces from 1977 to 1983.