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Documents

November 28, 1964

Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'The project of a global reorganization of the Atlantic Alliance's nuclear deterrent'

The project to which the document is related concerns only the strategic nuclear weapons, leaving instead the tactical ones under the specific territorial systems of control. The present document is about the components, political control and the NATO command.

November 1964

Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'NATO's nuclear weapons'

The memo deals with the reorganization of political control and of the "command chain" with respect to NATO's nuclear deterrent (opinions of the UK and France, Italian and German criticism).
There are 3 attachments: 1) Multilateral Nuclear Force. Italian stance with regards to British proposals (2 pages); 2) British position on Multilateral Force - Message from Washington on 4th December (5 pages); 3) Reorganization of the Atlantic nuclear deterrent (12 pages).

December 4, 1962

Report by Permanent Representative to NATO Alessandrini to Minister of Defense Andreotti

Italy's permanent representative to NATO Alessandrini writes to PM Andreotti in preparation for the upcoming Paris summit. He shares general remarks about the state of the alliance and current issues in international relations focusing on the German question, Cuba, and Sino-Soviet relations.

April 1, 1961

Memorandum by Admiral Corrado Tagliamonte to the Minister of Defense, 'American attitude toward NATO. President Kennedy's declarations'

Report submitted to the Italian Minister of Defense regarding President Kennedy’s opinion that NATO should not construct a special nuclear force since the US has already developed a nuclear deterrent. According to the Kennedy, the creation of an additional deterrent would be useless and a waste of resources.

June 17, 1961

Memorandum by General Staff of Defense (SMD), 'Atlantic Alliance's strategy - National military way of thinking'

Summary of NATO’s nuclear defense strategy, stressing the importance of utilizing both conventional and nuclear weapons and refraining from using more nuclear power than is absolutely necessary to combat Soviet aggression.

June 14, 1961

Report by Permanent Representative to NATO Alessandrini to Minister of Foreign Affairs Segni

Report on the imbalance between nuclear and conventional weapons in NATO’s defense program. The Allied powers have reduced their production of planes and ships in favor of nuclear weapons development, which worries Alessandrini because conventional weapons have not decreased in importance since the start of the Cold War.

February 7, 1961

Memorandum by Admiral Corrado Tagliamonte to the Minister of Defense, 'British memorandum on NATO nuclear weapons'

Observations of the SMD on two topics, "The British vision of NATO weapons" and "General Norstad to the Atlantic Council." It concludes with three handwritten pages by Alessandrini to Andreotti, 3 February 1961.

June 14, 1961

Report by Permanent Representative to NATO Alessandrini to Minister of Foreign Affairs Segni

Alessandrini writes regarding the Minister Of Foreign Affairs speech on the problems of NATO's military, including its nuclear strategy. Despite the assurances of the United States, Europeans fear of having to fight conventional Soviet forces.

October 29, 1960

Ten-Year Strategy Report by the General Staff of Defense (SMD) on Military problems of NATO to Minister of Defense Andreotti

This ten-year strategy report created by the SMD is about perspectives and problems that NATO should face in developing a military strategy. Topics: French nuclear strategy; NATO tactical and strategic nuclear weapons; the relevance of conventional weapons; possible improvement in the decision to use nuclear weapons; nuclear cooperation and integration in NATO countries.

October 1983

Memorandum comparing the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces and the Anglo – French forces capable of reaching the Soviet Union.

A comparison between the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces and the Anglo – French system capable of reaching the Soviet Union. The memo uses data to demonstrate that the Soviet INF outnumbered by far NATO nuclear forces.

Pagination