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Documents

January 7, 1963

MAE Analysis on NATO MLF after Nassau accords

MAE analysis on Nassau accords, issue of NATO MLF, and availability of naval units for Polaris program. Includes preliminary considerations on Italian position to the Atlantic Council.

June 13, 1963

Analysis by SMD on Proposal to assign to NATO Italian Polaris-armed Ships

Considerations by Gen. Aldo Rossi on prospective assignment to NATO of Italian ships armed with Polaris. Includes a discussion of issue of surface ships and responses by US Navy to Italian questions. Two annexes: 1 Inter-allied Nuclear Force, pros for Italy; 2 Italy's position on Multilateral Nuclear Force.

June 13, 1963

Annex to analysis by SMD on Proposal to assign to NATO Italian Polaris-armed Ships

Report by Gen. A. Rossi on Polaris SLBM and NATO naval forces, including technological and employment features, costs. The report includes discussions of IRBM forces in Italy, and French and British nuclear forces.

July 11, 1960

Letter from MAE to GA on Polaris Issue

Note for MD Andreotti concerning deployment of Polaris on Italian ships

August 18, 1960

Note by CSMD on IRBM

Brief Analysis by CSMD on political-military aspects of IRBM and Polaris

June 13, 1960

Report on SHAPE meeting

Analysis by the Head of the Italian Delegation to the North Atlantic Council (Alessandrini) of SHAPE meeting chaired by Gen. Norstad to examine Western/Soviet missile balance.

September 29, 1967

Report, 'Nuclear Planning Group's decisions, meeting at ministerial level'

The document presents NPG's decisions about the topics recently discussed at a meeting at the level of Ministers of Defense just concluded (Ankara, 28th-29th September 1967). The topics addressed were: ADM, tactical nuclear weapons, ABM, national participation in the military planning with regards to nuclear issues.

October 6, 1967

General Staff of Defense (SMD), 'Summary Report of the 2nd Nuclear Planning Group meeting at the level of Ministers of Defense (Ankara, 28-29 September 1967)'

The document reports the evolution of the meeting. Italy was there represented by the new Minister of Defense Tremelloni, the Chief of Staff Aloia, the diplomat Alessandrini (RICA) and others. Topics discussed: possible use of ADM; possible use of tactical nuclear weapons; ABM; Italian participation in military nuclear planning; information about the nuclear weapons deployed in NATO countries. Aloia believes that the discussion was fruitful, keeping in mind the complexity of the nuclear issues, that have just recently been able to count on permanent bodies appropriate to deal with them at a political level. France's negative behavior caused a postponement of the discussion about many military-political topics in the last years.

February 20, 1966

Report by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Nuclear Planning Working Group of the "Special Committee" (Washington, 17th-18th February, 1966),
with a letter from Andrea Cagiati'

Cagiati sends Andreotti a report about the meeting in Washington, which concluded Giulio Andreotti's period as Minister of Defense. Cagiati thanks Andreotti for his work, that made sure that "in this period the relationship between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense has been strong and efficient like never before". The report describes the meeting (the first meeting of this working group) and the viewpoints of the participants, with special attention payed to the US nuclear policy. The document describes also the fields which require further investigations by the Working Group. There are Cagiati's personal reflections too.

April 30, 1966

Report by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Special Committee.
Meeting of the Nuclear Planning Working Group at the level of Ministers of Defense (London, 28th-29th April 1966)'

The report describes the second meeting of the Nuclear Planning Working Group at the level of Ministers of Defense, during which a discussion about the planning, the use and the political control of tactical nuclear weapons has taken place. The document analyzes the SACEUR's position, the data related to the opposing armed forces existing in the European theater; the possible hypothesis of local conflicts and the problems related to the various scenarios. The London meeting was "open-ended", without leading to any concrete decision, and the topic appeared more complex than expected. The document observes that within the NATO there are diverging opinions on these matters.

Pagination