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March 11, 1963

Secret Telegram from Maneli (Hanoi) to Spasowski-Morski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 3175]

Cable from Polish Ambassador in Hanoi Maneli to Warsaw, describing a conversation he had with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and Soviet Ambassador Tovmassian. They discuss the idea of neutralization in Vietnam, and the possibility of the United States pulling forces out. Tovmassian adds that the PRC pressured the DRV to start incidents in the demilitarized zone.

February 13, 1963

Secret Telegram from Jaszczuk (Moscow) to Rapacki (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 2004]

Cable sent from a Polish representative in Moscow to Adam Rapacki in Warsaw about a meeting with Andrei Gromyko. He believes that the United States wishes to remove itself from the situation in Vietnam and concludes that a way to end the issue is getting closer.

October 30, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 30 October 1962

Jelen continues his analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

October 26, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 26 October 1962

According to Drozniak, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk has allegedly reported that the latest statements of journalists claiming the relaxation of tensions in the Cuban Missile Crisis do not correspond to the reality of serious tensions between the US and USSR.

October 26, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 26 October 1962

Drozniak makes an assessment of the Cuban Missile Crisis situation, based on his conversations with foreign diplomats and respected journalists. Among other topics, he includes his opinion that "The operation of installing the [Soviet] missiles in Cuba was carried out in great hurry, without special adherence to secrecy, and perhaps even with the awareness that the missiles would be discovered relatively quickly. This [fact] has been interpreted [by the Americans] as [a possible] attempt by the USSR to test Kennedy’s “the will and readiness to fight.” [Soviet leader Nikita S.] Khrushchev chose Cuba, because he considered Berlin to be too dangerous."

October 25, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 25 October 1962

Drozniak discusses the ongoing Cuban Missile Crisis situation, including the rumors of a possible US military invasion of Cuba.

October 24, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Moscow (Paszkowski), 24 October 1962

Paszkowski discusses changes in the tensions of the Cuban Missile Crisis situation, including his opinion that the US's recent actions and rhetoric were a pre-election bluff.

October 24, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 24 October 1962

On the Cuban Crisis situation, Jelen says that Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseyev is optimistic but Brazilian Ambassador Luis Bastian Pinto is concerned. Jelen also gives his own impressions of the crisis, saying that "There’s a relative run on the stores, but without any signs of panic and fears of the threat of military operations."