Drozniak forwards a report from US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs [Edwin M.] Martin. Martin says that the Americans are well-informed of the military situation in Cuba, that Cuba does not possess nuclear weapons (nor will they be likely to because the USSR did not give such weapons to China, so why would they give them to Cuba?), that the level of the Cuban economy is twenty-five percent lower than the period before Fidel Castro came to power and Cuba is much more economically dependent on the USSR, and finally that any military invasion or complete blockade of Cuba would be considered an act of war by the USSR.

Drozniak discusses the possibility of US military action against Cuba, as well as Cuba's foreign relations with the USSR and the US.

Drozniak replies to Ogrodzinski regarding the information he received from from [Charles E. “Chip”] Bohlen that Cuba has been removed from the list of priorities of US foreign policy. Bohlen also confirms, through Drozniak, that the content of the talks between [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk and [Soviet Ambassador Anatoly] Dobrynin. The Americans are assessing that the USSR is not currently in any hurry to resolve the issue of Berlin. When it comes to a next meeting [between the Americans and the Soviets], the US will wait for a Soviet initiative.

There is an opinion among a small group of the heads of Latin American diplomatic posts that the US would push through the sanctions against Cuba, except for the military ones, as far as possible.

Summary of comments made by Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Rodriguez criticizes the Soviet Union's decision to withdraw its missiles, questioning the Soviet commitment to the defense of Cuba.

This is a transcript of a lecture delivered by Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to the Polish General Staff about Soviet military doctrine in early 1988. The document defines what the Soviets meant by military doctrine, differentiating between the doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by stressing the former’s wider range objectives, especially concerning the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, it identifies contemporary issues facing Soviet doctrine and analyzes topics such as nuclear non-proliferation, reduction of nuclear stockpiles and refutes the idea that nuclear weapons should be used in a counter-offensive operation. It stresses the importance of defense, negating offensive military preparedness in lieu of purely defensive Warsaw Pact capabilities (albeit altogether sufficient to successfully deter a NATO attack from the West). It also discusses the results of the March 2-3 1988 NATO talks and concludes that the West is not willing to stop the arms race and is increasing its offensive capabilities. The Warsaw Pact’s response should include increased military research, better vigilance to capture signals of a possible attack and more tactical and technical training for the military command. It asserts that even though a war is less likely than in the past, quoting Gorbachev, “the nature of capitalism itself can be the cause of war.”

Polish document describing the speech given by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This documents is a translation of the version the Soviet leadership sent to the United Polish Workers’ Party for the information of the Polish leadership.

Letter from Gomulka to Khrushchev discussing Polish opposition to Soviet proposal for a Non-Proliferation Treaty. Gomulka suggests that the treaty will further split the communist camp. While discussing the state of Sino-Soviet relations, the Polish leader suggests that the Soviet Union and the PRC adopt a common position in matters of foreign policy in order to strengthen the power of the Socialist camp.

Gomulka and Brezhnev discuss Sino-Soviet border skirmishes. Brezhnev claims the Chinese are preparing for their Congress and trying to "cement the moods of enmity toward the USSR." They also discuss the possibility of improved Sino-American ties.

Rakhmanin reports on the state of China in relation to various countries such as the U.S. and Japan (with whom he worries a "triangle" of power is forming), Romania, Korea and Albania.