At a working lunch, Mazowiecki and Deputy Secretary of State L. Eagleburger discuss the dangers of Balkanization. Additionally, they discuss the difficulties of European unification in the current political climate. 

Mazowiecki and Cheney discuss Poland’s military, Soviet troop withdraw, and the future of NATO.

Mazowiecki and CIA Director W. Webster discussed relaxing COCOM restrictions and Gorbachev’s response to both Lithuanian independence and German reunification.

Over two days of meetings, Bush and Mazowiecki discuss German reunification, the future of relations with the Soviet Union/Russia, and NATO.

Cable from Adam Rapacki to the Polish representative in Moscow informing him of Jerzy Michałowski’s coming arrival in Moscow, in light of recent Soviet-US and Polish-US talks on South Vietnam.

The Polish Embassy in Romania reports on trends in Romanian foreign relations. There are signs of rapprochement with the other socialist countries in the Warsaw Pact after Romania reversed course to join Comecon. Yet Ceaușescu continued to court China and the United States as well.

Meeting minutes from a conference of the Communist and Workers’ parties and chiefs of governments of the socialist countries on the situation in the Middle East (held in Budapest, 11-12 July 1967). Kosygin first reports on conversations with Charles De Gaulle in Paris and with Lyndon Johnson in Glassboro.

Jelen continues his analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

According to Drozniak, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk has allegedly reported that the latest statements of journalists claiming the relaxation of tensions in the Cuban Missile Crisis do not correspond to the reality of serious tensions between the US and USSR.

Drozniak makes an assessment of the Cuban Missile Crisis situation, based on his conversations with foreign diplomats and respected journalists. Among other topics, he includes his opinion that "The operation of installing the [Soviet] missiles in Cuba was carried out in great hurry, without special adherence to secrecy, and perhaps even with the awareness that the missiles would be discovered relatively quickly. This [fact] has been interpreted [by the Americans] as [a possible] attempt by the USSR to test Kennedy’s “the will and readiness to fight.” [Soviet leader Nikita S.] Khrushchev chose Cuba, because he considered Berlin to be too dangerous."