This message summarizes responses to the Rapacki Plan from countries in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and North America.

Deputy Minister Marian Naszkowski offers guidance for swaying public opinion in Sweden in favor of the Rapacki plan.

This note describes a conference of important governmental leaders that gathered on Dec. 21, 1961 to hear Gosnjak speak. He spoke about the power of socialism and the importance of a united Soviet bloc against adversity.

Reports recounting Osinski's experiences with infighting between the Polish Ministry of Defense (MND), and the Stalinist Internal Security Corps (ISC). The reports also take place during the Polish October (Gomulka' Thaw). Normal font indicates that the text appears in both instances of the document. Italics indicates that the text appears only in the original, handwritten version of the document. Bold font indicates that the text appears only in the final, typed version for Gomulka.

Summary of the 14th meeting of the Warsaw BlocDefense Ministers Committee. The ministers discuss the Solidarity movement and protests in Poland, and how to handle the issue in the media.

Polish and Soviet proposals for structural, organizational, and budgetary adjustments to the military articles of the Warsaw Treaty are reported and analyzed.

The Polish general staff analyzes the military obligations mandated by the Warsaw Treaty and how stated obligations are not compatible with Polish policy. Proposals for revision of the military articles of the Warsaw Treaty are outlined.

General Pavlovsky writes to the Commander of the Polish Second Army, Brigadier General Florian Siwicki. He lists preliminary steps in Operation Danube where the troops enter from Poland into Czechoslovakia.

Report states the morale of soldiers taking part in Operation Danube is still good. But there is still no change in the unfriendly relations between Czech people and Warsaw Pact soldiers. The report describes how the Czech people are under the influence of revisionist and reactionary propaganda. It also details the conflict between Czech soldiers and Polish soldiers. It also gives an update of propaganda being broadcast through Czech radio stations.

This is a transcript of a lecture delivered by Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to the Polish General Staff about Soviet military doctrine in early 1988. The document defines what the Soviets meant by military doctrine, differentiating between the doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by stressing the former’s wider range objectives, especially concerning the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, it identifies contemporary issues facing Soviet doctrine and analyzes topics such as nuclear non-proliferation, reduction of nuclear stockpiles and refutes the idea that nuclear weapons should be used in a counter-offensive operation. It stresses the importance of defense, negating offensive military preparedness in lieu of purely defensive Warsaw Pact capabilities (albeit altogether sufficient to successfully deter a NATO attack from the West). It also discusses the results of the March 2-3 1988 NATO talks and concludes that the West is not willing to stop the arms race and is increasing its offensive capabilities. The Warsaw Pact’s response should include increased military research, better vigilance to capture signals of a possible attack and more tactical and technical training for the military command. It asserts that even though a war is less likely than in the past, quoting Gorbachev, “the nature of capitalism itself can be the cause of war.”