A report from Roberto de Oliveira Campos on how certain actions and diplomatic moves during the Cuban crisis have served to inflame international tensions on both sides.

In conversation with a high officials from the State Department about the prospects of the Cuban situation, three hypotheses about the future Soviet comportment are discussed: 1) abandon entirely the government of Fidel Castro to its own fate; 2) limit itself to leave constituted in Cuba a socialist regime, based on a well-structured communist party and endowed with a repressive political machine, as a political base of propaganda and infiltration in Latin America and 3) to intensify Soviet technical and economic assistance in a manner to transform Cuba into a living demonstration of the efficacy of communism as an instrument of economic development in Latin America. The letter goes on to describe these three points in more detail.

Mello-Franco discusses a conversation he had with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov. According to Kuznetsov, the American insistence on the question of inspection is becoming moot [ociosa] since the United States has declared satisfaction with the removal of offensive material existing in Cuba, it is only a pretext to postpone indefinitely the commitment of non-invasion and suspension of the economic blockade against Cuba.

Pinto describes a meeting with Roa in which Roa repeats a message from Fidel Castro's proclamation that the evacuation of the American base Guantanamo should be directed at not only the United States, but also the Soviet Union, to show both that Cuba is not a toy of the great powers and should be heard in the coming negotiations.

A memorandum on the Cuban Missile Crisis covering perspectives from the three major actors: U.S., Soviet Union and Cuba.

Campos sends an attached memorandum of analysis of the developments of the Cuban crisis, elaborated by the Political Sector of the Embassy. It discusses Soviet motivation, American actions, Soviet reactions, etc.

Campos discusses agreements that are being made between Kennedy and Khrushchev regarding the immediate dismantling of the missile bases in Cuba, international inspections of Cuba, and an abandonment of the demand for reciprocity in Turkey.

Campos discusses the brief alleviation in tensions between the United States and Soviet Union over the Cuban issue due to a temporary accord for a limited-diversion of the Soviet ships.

The Brazilian Delegation to the OAS reports that the American Delegation at the General Assembly of the United Nations will enter into contact with the Brazilian Delegation to examine the proposal for banning nuclear arms in Latin America and Africa. In the opinion of the Brazilian Delegation, the North American interest in the proposition is aimed at neutralizing the effect of the Soviet manifestation.

A telegram from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to the Brazilian Embassy in Washington relaying a message from the Brazilian Embassy in Moscow regarding their interpretations of the Soviet Union's position on the events related to the Cuban Missile Crisis and U.S.-Cuban relations. The ambassador feels that the Soviets fear war more than the North-Americans; and he says that at no point does the Soviet government specifically refute the NorthAmerican affirmation that it is sending an amount of offensive armament with Cuba, limiting itself to reiterating that the Cuban-Soviet accord of 3 September for defensive military help to Cuba continues in force.