On April 1993, Brazilian diplomats met once more with Robert Einhorn, now Deputy Assistant Secretary for Chemical Weapons and Proliferation. Einhorn was mainly concerned with the delay in the approval of the export control legislation in Brazil and wondered if the issue was not losing priority in the Brazilian government’s agenda. He also tried to discourage the development of Brazilian SLV by arguing that it would not be economically advantageous for the country.

On September 14th-15th 1992, The Brazilian government received the US technical mission on strategic trade. Among the issues discussed during the meeting, the most important was Brazil’s export control legislation for sensitive goods and technologies, which was still to be voted on by the Brazilian Congress at the time.

This cable reports the meeting between Brazilian diplomat Sergio Amaral, Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant for Politico-Military Affairs, and Vahn H. Van Diepen, Director of the Office of Weapons Proliferation. Eihorn made clear during the meeting that space programs such as Brazil’s are a source of concern for the US administration because it could use the same technology developed for the SLV to build ballistic missiles.

This cable shows Ambassador Ricúpero’s reaction to Brazil’s inclusion in the list of “validated license.” Ambassador Ricúpero recommended that President Fernando Collor express Brazilian disappointment with this decision in a letter to President George Bush.

This cable, sent from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington to Brasília, reports Brazil’s inclusion in the list of countries that might manufacture rockets. The inclusion was in the supplement number 6 section 778 of the “Export Administration Regulations.” The US administration’s report on the list also notes the importance of the Brazilian government’s recent steps towards non-proliferation and that its inclusion in the list is due to its rocket programs and the development of its SLV.

This cable reports the outcome of the visit made by the Missile Technology Control Regime's mission to Brazil headed by Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. Throughout the meeting, the Brazilian space program was described as the most sensitive issue in regard to the MTCR.

This is a letter written by Brazilian Congressman Herbert Levy which reveals the content of his meetings with high U.S. governmental officials regarding his concern about Argentina’s nuclear activities less than a year after the Falklands/Malvinas War. In these conversations, Levy states that Argentina might develop a nuclear artifact.

Confidential report identifying major trends regarding uranium supply. The document assesses US capacity to supply nuclear fuel after 1980, and describes European initiatives to manage the fuel cycle. The document underscores the convenience of defining guidelines, which “might ensure Brazilian leadership in Latin America” (p.105); then, it outlines the difficulties inherent to the establishment of a bilateral agreement with the US (taking into account the Brazilian position vis-à-vis the NPT), and suggests Europe (most notably West Germany) as a potential partner. The document recommends the establishment of a confidential working group formed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Mines and Energy in order to set up a strategy that would allow for the establishment of a nuclear cooperation agreement with the partner country, at the time still undefined.

Vice-President Adalberto Pereira reports on a meeting with Republican Congressman Paul Findley, who proposed, on a personal basis, the creation of a nuclear mutual surveillance system between Brazil and Argentina, with a view to allaying doubts about a possible arms race. Findley had already presented the proposal to Ambassador Geraldo Holanda Cavalcanti, (aide to Minister Silveira) on the occasion of the visit to Brasília on August 23 1977. According to the agreement he proposed, Brazil and Argentina would renounce the intention to develop a nuclear device and would accept mutual inspections of their respective nuclear facilities.

A collection of Brazilian ambassadors and ministers gather to meet and discuss the impact of Cuba-US relations on the region in preparation for a gathering of Organization of American States (OAS) foreign ministers scheduled for 22-31 January 1962. The government officials’ primary concerns are to manage the impact of the "Cuban problem" on domestic Brazilian politics and to develop an independent line of thought, without jeopardizing its relationship with the US. The officials want to craft an approach for the OAS meeting that will not cause Brazil to become a mediator between hostile parties nor incite Brazilian public opinion in favor of communism.