Confidential report identifying major trends regarding uranium supply. The document assesses US capacity to supply nuclear fuel after 1980, and describes European initiatives to manage the fuel cycle. The document underscores the convenience of defining guidelines, which “might ensure Brazilian leadership in Latin America” (p.105); then, it outlines the difficulties inherent to the establishment of a bilateral agreement with the US (taking into account the Brazilian position vis-à-vis the NPT), and suggests Europe (most notably West Germany) as a potential partner. The document recommends the establishment of a confidential working group formed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Mines and Energy in order to set up a strategy that would allow for the establishment of a nuclear cooperation agreement with the partner country, at the time still undefined.

A collection of Brazilian ambassadors and ministers gather to meet and discuss the impact of Cuba-US relations on the region in preparation for a gathering of Organization of American States (OAS) foreign ministers scheduled for 22-31 January 1962. The government officials’ primary concerns are to manage the impact of the "Cuban problem" on domestic Brazilian politics and to develop an independent line of thought, without jeopardizing its relationship with the US. The officials want to craft an approach for the OAS meeting that will not cause Brazil to become a mediator between hostile parties nor incite Brazilian public opinion in favor of communism.

The tight secrecy continues to surround the conversations with Anastas Mikoyan, however in a conversation with Pinto, he reveals information concerning: Fidel Castro, Cuban-Soviet relations during the crisis and Cuba's refusal to submit to international inspections.

In conversation with a high officials from the State Department about the prospects of the Cuban situation, three hypotheses about the future Soviet comportment are discussed: 1) abandon entirely the government of Fidel Castro to its own fate; 2) limit itself to leave constituted in Cuba a socialist regime, based on a well-structured communist party and endowed with a repressive political machine, as a political base of propaganda and infiltration in Latin America and 3) to intensify Soviet technical and economic assistance in a manner to transform Cuba into a living demonstration of the efficacy of communism as an instrument of economic development in Latin America. The letter goes on to describe these three points in more detail.

Pinto describes the current situation in Cuba from the perspective of the Brazilian Embassy in Havana. He says, "The country continues entirely mobilized for the defense. The attitude of the Government seems to be more cautious. Habituated for years of the threat and with the blockade in front of Havana, the revolutionary government is plainly conscious that the danger has not passed and can reemerge at any moment."

Pinto describes two recent speeches, one by Kennedy the other by Castro, and appears to give more credit and praise to the speech by Castro. He also discusses the Cuban crisis situation in general.

Brazil's embassy in Moscow discusses visits by Novotny, Ulbricht and Gomulka to Moscow and says that there is the impression that the recent international events have created a state of disorientation in the community of socialist countries and that the great challenge of Khrushchev will be to accommodate this state of affairs in the short term.

The Brazilian Embassy in Poland discusses Poland's sympathy on the Brazilian motion in the United Nations about the denuclearization and its favorable reflection in a solution of the Cuban crisis.

Campos discusses diplomatic gestures between Brazil, the United States and Cuba during the Cuban crisis and some misunderstandings that may have emerged during that time.

The Brazilian government offers elements of their Armed Forces for collaboration in the blockade of Cuba, authorized by the OAS and executed by the American government. Brazil does so for three reasons: their affirmative vote on the blockade in the OAS, most Latin American countries have contributed armed forces and it is a gesture of cooperate with the United States.